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Political Photo-Poems

Trump and Putin Who’s confident and cock-sure here?

Speech acts as foreign policy

An art form mastered by Trump and Duterte

Russians are now the Americans’ best friends

Would’nt gets passed off as would

Or was it the other way around?

Landgrabbing by a new hegemon

euphemized as co-control

Metternich and Cardinal Richelieu must be scratching their heads

In awe, in woeful awe!

XJP and Dutz Who’s the obvious top-dog here?

©bongmallongamendoza 29 jul 2018

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bs ni bt (Ben Tulfo)

Posted: July 30, 2018 in Uncategorized

Political Photo-Poems

Ben Tulfo Feeling guapo?  Bakit palaging naka-shades si BT?

anong apog

meron ang isang Ben Tulfo

para tahasan niyang

masabi mamumuti muna

ang mga mata natin

mamumuti muna ang mga

uwak at ganso bago nila

silang mga mandarambong na magkakapatid

ang ninakaw na salapi ng bayan!

©bongmallongamendoza 30 jul 2018

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I liked a lot of what I heard and saw of the Dutz yesterday at the Batasan. For one, I applaud the absence of ‘eloquent’ (matunog at malutong) curses and choice epithets.

I like it too that he stuck to the written speech.

It was his Trumpian moment.

He made a number of promises that I fervently wish (though my training as a social scientist and a student of history tempers my hopes) he will fulfill like dismantling the rice cartel, fast-tracking the entry of a third TELCO to put the duopoly (a word he used in his SONA) in its proper place, establishment of a coco farmers trust fund, and putting a final end to ENDO, among others.

In making these promises, he displayed a better understanding of the limits and possibilities of executive power and the separation of powers, specially between the executive and legislative branches of government.

However, he stayed hardheadedly with a mistaken dichotomy with regards to human rights and human lives.

May I remind the President, together with others who have earlier raised this point (like Lan Mercado) that the primary human right is the right to live, and that one’s life cannot just be extinguished without proper cause, specially in a jurisdiction that has abolished the death penalty.

Which leads me to a question: are extra-judicial killings an unwanted consequence of the abolition of the death penalty?

I also suspect he mispronounced his words: he uttered the phrase “more chilling” while reiterating a commitment to continue the war on drugs.

Did he really mean to say “more killing”?

But then, I will also ask: Does it make a difference if he said “chilling” rather than “killing”?

Is this a case of useless parsing on my part?

Meanwhile, something happened before the President’s SONA.  On national TV, former President and now Representative of a congressional district of the province of Pampanga, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) became SGMA–Speaker (of the House of Representatives) GMA–in a silent movie as men of her rival, soon-to-be-deposed Speaker Pantaleon Alvarez cut off the public address system in an attempt to stop the power shift.  The effort was futile.  

Political scientists are primarily interested in the study of power (wer-pa, if you will), its use and abuse. For this reason, I would like to ‘thank’ GMA and her lieutenants for offering an extremely transparent and public display of power, a power play that will make Queen Cersei bite her lips with envy.

Perhaps George R.R. Martin should employ GMA’s chief strategist as a consultant to complete and make the GOT last season’s plot more compelling.

I also thank Inday Sara for being so transparent too. She is the latest Exhibit of the prescient warning: “Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned”.  I also thank Rep. Antonio Floreindo Jr. (also of Davao) for reminding us that karma is a bitch and that revenge is oh so sweet!

“Hell hath no fury” is an interpreted line based on a quotation from The Mourning Bride, a play by William Congreve, which reads in full “Heav’n has no rage like love to hatred turn’d / Nor Hell a fury, like a woman scorn’d.” William Congreve is an English author of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.

The coup at the Batasan will surely figure as a case in many political science and business courses (especially those who adhere to the Harvard Business School’s case study method) as an excellent study of a hostile takeover. It could also figure in a parody of the Shakespearian play “Comedy of Errors” with all the hulla-balloo over a dejected and weeping deposed speaker in a funny barong, dead sound systems, disappearing maces, and illegal plenaries.

Attention Jean, Jean, and Aida: should we also use GMA as an example of a ‘masculinized woman’?


Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, former president of the Philippines, now Speaker of the House of Representatives

Nuclear explosion

Nuclear explosion

Nuclear weapons do not make war between states impossible. They only make wars between Great Powers ‘cold’ rather than ‘hot’ shooting wars. Even if ‘cold’, a cold war is a war just the same. The Cold War of the 20th century between the USA and the USSR was fought through an extremely expensive and dangerous strategic arms race and conventional proxy wars. The Soviet Union could not match the US move to deploy strategic weapons in outer space. It lost the Cold War and had to disappear into the pages of history in the 1990s. The Soviet bloc also collapsed and a few of former Soviet allies are now members of the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Gorbachev in first public appearance after Augist coup

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev returns to Moscow after a coup against him fizzles out a few months before the Soviet Union gets dissolved as an independent state


Vestiges of the 20th century Cold War remain in the region and the focal point is the Korean peninsula.  The situation in Korea and the broader Northeast Asian strategic environment can change if the current US-North Korean rapprochment will eventually lead to a peace treaty between the two states and denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.
Kim Trump summit photo

North Korean leader Kim Jung Un meets US President Donald Trump in Singapore



Northeast Asia


South Asia is also a potential trouble spot as nuclear weapons states India and Pakistan continue to face each other in hostile emnity.

South Asia

Since three-four years ago, two new Cold Wars commenced.  
The first is between frenemies US and China in the Indo Asia-Pacific theater.
The second is between the US and Russia (both are clearly enemies to each other notwithstanding President Donald Trump’s cozying up to Russian leader Vladimir Putin) in the European and Middle East- North Africa (MENA) theaters.
Europe and Middle East

Eurasia and the Middle East



This means that the US is waging a two-front ‘cold’ war.
In the Indo Asia-Pacific theater, the US superiority in strategic and conventional weaponry does not guarantee regional hegemony.  For one, it does not have enough carrots to win and consolidate friendships and alliances.
In contrast, China has a lot of carrots (including the various connectivity schemes like the Belt and Road Initiative, the Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank, and the readiness to bribe state leaders in exchange for contracts and friendly relations).
Through a classic carrots-and-sticks strategy, China has been balkanizing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with some degree of success.  The soft targets of China’s carrots are the poorer members of ASEAN like Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar as well as the next member of ASEAN–Timor Leste.

Southeast Asia


China is also actively pushing its lines of defense outward away from its coastlines through aggressive force projection platform building in the South China Sea/West Philippines and territorial claims in both Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia.  In response to Chinese activism ang aggressiveness, a broad anti-China alliance has formed in the region.  The US move to rename its former Asia Pacific (military) theater to the Indo Asia-Pacific theater is a recognition of the importance of the Indian Ocean and India in its bid to contain and engage China. The US effort to get India in its anti-China effort is stifled by US support for India’s enemy, Pakistan.
The US cannot successfully complete its rebalancing to Asia (clearly an anti-China strategy) as it is still embroiled in serious disputes in too many other places (Ukraine, Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen, Iraq, Iran, Venezuela, etc) in the rest of the world.
President Trump Holds Joint Press Conference With Japan Prime Minister Shinzo Abe

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and US President Donald Trump


For this reason, its Asian allies are rethinking their relations with the US and adopting independent strategies. Of course, the US had been exhorting its allies to spend more for their own defense, a call reiterated in so many ways by incumbent US President Donald Trump. The new South Korean leader is now keen to normalize relations with North Korea. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had been tyrying to change Japanese strategic doctrine so it becomes a normal power and its military forces shed its limited ‘self-defense’ role and assume full military capabilities and responsibilities. I believe that if the US under President Trump shirks on its responsibility to its Northeast Asian allies, given the rapproachment with North Korea, Japan will develop its own nuclear weaponry ala Charles de Gaulle’s force de frappe.

French nuclear submarine aptly named Le Terrible


We do indeed live in very interesting times specially since eccentric leaders like Trump and North Korea’s Kim Jung Un can really change the game!

FM in his 1986 inauguration

Author’s note: This paper will be a chapter in a forthcoming reader on martial law edited by Prof. Ferdie Lllanes of the Department of History, CSSP, UP Diliman

Orthodox economic theory looks negatively at monopoly (or monopsony), defined as a market situation where there is only one producer or seller (or purchaser in a monopsony) of a commodity, usually a strategic one like electricity or fuel or food. This is so since the total absence of competition enables the monopolist (or the monopsonist) to dictate prices to as high a level that buyers (or sellers) could bear with. In addition, the monopolist is also impervious to pressures to improve product quality as well as increase supply (as this will, all other things being equal, lower price and reduce the monopolist’s profit margins).

Fortunately and contrary to popular belief, dictatorships are never and cannot be monopolies of political power. A single person, the dictator, cannot do it alone. He rules and reigns with an entire panoply of lieutenants, armed men, sycophants, apologists, and supporters—and the latter partake of the dictator’s power and influence albeit to a lesser degree. Without US Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, Vice President George Bush, and local lieutenants–Imelda Marcos, Fabian Ver, Danding Cojuangco, Juan Ponce-Enrile, Fidel Ramos, Gringo Honasan, Rolando Abadilla, and many other less-known personalities–Ferdinand Edralin Marcos would not have been able to exercise tremendous power during the so-called martial law period from September 1972 to February 1986.


Marcos and Nixon

Ferdinand Marcos and Richard Nixon (public image from Internet)

Pace Bueno de Mesquita, the selectorate, nominal selectorate, and winning coalition for a dictator may be smaller than those in a democracy. Nonetheless, without the support of the members of the appropriate selectorate and winning coalition, a dictatorship cannot be inaugurated and cannot sustain itself since a dictatorship normally engenders reaction and resistance. There will always be an anti-dictatorship coalition, no matter how puny it will be at the beginning. This anti-dictatorship will serve as the core of the selectorate and winning coalition for a non-authoritarian post-dictatorial regime.



Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda Marcos welcomed by US President Ronald Reagan outside the Oval Office in 1982

In Bueno de Mesquita et. al’s theory, three groups of people affect leaders. These groups are the nominal selectorate, the real selectorate, and the winning coalition. The nominal selectorate, also referred to as the interchangeables, includes every person who has some say in choosing the leader. For example, in a Philippine presidential election, all registered voters. The real selectorate, also referred to as the influentials, are those who really choose the leaders (for example, in the same Philippine presidential election, those people who actually cast a vote. The winning coalition, also referred to as the essentials, are those whose support translates into victory. In the same Philippine presidential election, the winning coalition is the mass of voters who chose Duterte. Even if these voters are lesser in number than those who did not vote for Duterte, they carried the day since the Philippine Constitution does not require a second round run-off. The candidate who gets the plurality of votes is declared winner.

In other countries, leaders may stay in power with the support of much smaller numbers of people, such as senior figures in the security forces, and business oligarchs, as in contemporary Russia currently headed by Vladimir Putin.

The fundamental premise in selectorate theory is that the primary goal of a leader is to remain in power. To remain in power, leaders must maintain their winning coalition. When the winning coalition is small, as in autocracies, the leader will tend to use private goods to satisfy the coalition. When the winning coalition is large, as in democracies, the leader will tend to use public goods to satisfy the coalition.

At any rate, the cost-effective and efficient thing to do for any leader is to keep the winning coalition to a minimum. Of course, a large winning coalition contributes to a more stable and productive governance. But it more costly, from the leader’s viewpoint to maintain a larger than minimum necessary winning coalition.

The purpose of this paper is to show how the support of this appropriate selectorate and winning coalition was sought and maintained by Marcos and his chief lieutenants.

In the aptly titled The Dictators Handbook (2012), Bueno de Mesquita and co-author Alastair Smith state five rules that leaders should use to stay in power: (1) The smaller the winning coalition the fewer people to satisfy to remain in control. (2) Having a large nominal selectorate gives a pool of potential people to replace dissenters in coalition. (3) Maintain control of revenue flows to redistribute to your friends. (4) But only pay friends enough that they will not consider overthrowing you and at the same time little enough so that they depend on you. (5) Don’t take your friends’ money and redistribute it to the masses.


This paper will investigate how faithfully Marcos followed these rules and find out the consequences of disobeying them. We do know that Marcos was weakened by splits in his original winning coalition when Ponce Enrile formed the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) as his private army in support of his bid to succeed Marcos in case the latter dies or gets fatally ill. Enrile was reportedly incensed upon his discovery of a secret decree naming Imelda and Ver as heads of the caretaker committee that will take over when Marcos dies or gets sick. Another interesting question: why did Fidel Ramos defect from the Marcos winning coalition? Was he also jealous of Imelda and Ver? Did he correctly read that Marcos was on his way down and he wanted to secure his own post-Marcos future?

Kim Trump summit photo



Of course, I am referring to the unprecedented (and hilariously touchy-feely) meeting between US President Donald J. Trump (formerly known as ‘Dotard’ as far as the North Koreans were concerned) and North Korean leader Kim Jung-un (formerly known as ‘Rocketman’ according to Trump himself) in Singapore a few days ago.  And the simple and stark document (supposedly long on motherhood statements and short on details) regarding the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula signed by both leaders before they each left for different destinations.


The proverbial ink on the document was still wet yet complaints and sour-graping in many parts of the United States slowly rose in a crescendo.  A number complained that the US inexplicably backed down from its initial position of securing a complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (aka CVID) commitment from Kim.  Others said meeting Kim on such a prominent world stage was a major win for the latter and his bid to legitimize his country and oppressive regime officiated by no less than the leader of the so-called free world.    In fact, Kim also secured an invitation from Trump to visit the White House very soon.  A few focused on Trump’s faux pas when he saluted a North Korean general after the latter saluted him rather than shake his proferred hand.  Before long, cable TV commentators started characterizing Trump no longer a bully but now a ‘pussy cat’.


As if that was not enough, many (specially in Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo) were alarmed by Trump’s unilateral cancellation of joint US-South Korean military exercises in his solo press conference after his meeting with Kim, ostensibly for economic reasons.  For this reason, newly-designated Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had to assure American allies that Trump did not give away too much to Kim and that sanctions will be lifted only after denuclearization had been completed ( See and  


One must ask:  What can be reasonably expected from a five-hour meeting that was almost scuttled at the 11th hour?  

My answer:  what resulted!

President Trump, I believe, won’t get cheated of his media moment, by insisting on a long document that lists all the doables on both sides (more particularly by the North Koreans) and the corresponding detailed timetable.  Those particulars must be sweated out by diplomatic teams on both sides.  If and when such a detailed agreement is ready, expect another and a more spectacular summit between Trump and Kim.  Perhaps by that time, both may have been nominated for (or have even won) the Nobel Peace Prize.  For Trump, preferably that second summit will happen before the midterm elections or at least before his term ends.  Kim meanwhile is prepared for the long haul.


So, we just have to wait and see.  Who knows?  Drafts of that detailed agreement may be subject of talks between the two sides when Kim visits the White House soon.






Trump Kim summit picture

written with Professor Joseph Capuno of the UP School of Economics




Bonifacio and Katipunan



It is the common belief among Filipinos that we are freedom-loving and that we prefer democracy over all other political arrangements.  This belief supposedly stems from a long history of rebelliousness against centuries of Spanish, American and Japanese colonialism.  In recent years, the preference for democracy and freedom was supposedly affirmed by the struggle against the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos from 1972 to 1986 and was consolidated in the national psyche by the EDSA I people power phenomenon.  This narrative has been the staple of Filipino pop culture–movies, television serials, radio drama, literature and the like.


Bud Bajo massacre

American soldiers posing with killed Moro insurgents in the Bud Bajo massacre (Source:


Filipino anti-Japanese guerillas in Mindanao

Filipino anti-Japanese guerillas in Mindanao.  See

However, scholarly opinion differs from this popular perception.  Apparently, Filipinos depend on their betters, bow to power, and prefer to be led by a strong and forceful leader, one even willing to brush aside the legal niceties to get things done, and quickly.  

There is a strong literature on a ‘big men’ tradition in Southeast Asia and elsewhere (Abinales 2000, Alagappa 1995, Bayart 1993, Bratorry and van de Walle, Brown 1990, Clapham 1982, Ellen 2011, Ileto 2007, Hagesteijn and van de Velde 1996, Kathirithamby-Wells 1986, Kulke 1986, Sahlins 1963, Soenarno 1960, and Wolters 1999).  Native terms—orang besar (big men) and orang kaya (rich men) were developed.  The American Southeast Asianoligist, Wolters (1999) offered the term ‘men of prowess’.  The pioneering Filipino political scientist Remigio Agpalo (1973) asserted that Filipinos respect and fear authority and subscribe to a leader who called the shots.  Agpalo indigenized the Platonic ‘medicinal lie’ and formulated his so-called organic-hierarchical paradigm. In Plato’s writings on the role of different men in society, he likened merchants and farmers to the stomach of a person and the soldiers to the arms.  For Plato, the rulers of a society correspond to the head or brains.  Later, Agpalo will call his paradigm the Pangulo regime (with ulo referring to the head).  Even if Agpalo was obviously responding to the strength and charisma of the then newly-installed dictator Marcos, he may not be blamed since some 30 million Filipinos (given a few exceptions such as the Communists and Bangsa Moro insurgents) docilely accepted the Marcosian New Society under the joint leadership and reign of Malakas II (Ferdinand) and Maganda II (Imelda).


Remigio Agpalo

Prof. Remigio Agpalo


The play “Fake” by Floy Quintos (directed by Tony Mabesa) reminded one of William Henry Scott’s demolition of the efforts of the antiquarian Juan Marco of Pontevedra, Negros–not far from Bacolod City, not far from the fabled convent of Frayle Pavon–whose manuscripts that referred to the now-discredited Code of Kalantiaw, were earlier considered evidence of ancient pre-colonial civilizations complete with strong leaders and penal codes.


Fake by Floy Quintos




Earlier, Lande (1964) recast the ‘big men’ as the patrons in a super-ordinate relationship with subordinate clients.

Carl Lande

Professor Carl Herman Lande

The classic patron-client relationship is that between the landlord and his landless tenant.  Related to the ‘big men’ literature is an equally rich one on the role of prominent families and clans in Philippine politics best exemplified by McCoy (1999) and Simbulan (2005).  Sidel (1999) meanwhile, highlighted the ubiquity of threats, armed violence, and fraud in the rise and demise of local strong men in Philippine politics.

Immediately after the EDSA 1986 People Power Revolution, an American journalist,  James Fallows, (writing in The Atlantic Monthly) referred to the Filipinos’ damaged culture, a play on the lethal mix of almost-400 years in a “Spanish convent” and 40 years in an “American whorehouse or bordello”  (For this, please click…/11/a-damaged-culture/505178/ ).  He noted the divergence from formal institutions and de facto  behavior.  Fallows argued that Filipinos from all walks of life are not nationalistic and do not have national pride, unlike its Asian neighbors.  he went on to say that this cultural flaw is the main reason why Philippine society will remain in a muddle and economic growth will continue to be middling.

De Dios (2008) revisits the question in his inquiry into the institutional constraints to Philippine economic growth. Among other factors, he also draws attention to the same phenomenon, this time called cognitive dissonance, the divergence between formal institutions and actual practice and that this divergence from rules creates ‘pathologies’ such as corruption, boom-and-bust economic cycles, and political instability, among others.  De Dios goes further and explains why the divergence exists: coexistence of foreign and indigenous institutions and corresponding world-views, which look at the same practice differently. For instance, Westerners may call it corruption while Filipinos and other Asians would simply consider it gift-giving or grease (padulas) to facilitate transactions especially between strangers. Westerners insist on impersonal, arms-length relationships while Filipinos are socialized to valorize the family.  Former UPSE Dean Prof. Raul Fabella weighed in and talked about the contagion effect: when leaders do not walk their talk, those below them will follow suit and dissonance becomes society-wide; except in Subic and other few places where rules are implemented.

Where lies the truth?  With the experts and academics?  Or with popular perceptions?  This question is interesting and gains traction given the rise of another ‘strong man’ in the person of Rodrigo Roa Duterte as the country’s president (Curato 2017 and Heydarian 2018).  Duterte apparently models himself after Ferdinand Marcos, not hiding his admiration for the deceased dictator by having his remains buried in the Libingan ng mga Bayani almost immediately after he was sworn into office in July 2016.


PRRD gesturing with hands

President Rodrigo Duterte (VOA photo)


Or perhaps, it is erroneous to generalize on the political values and attitudes of Filipinos.  After all, we are such a diverse lotIt would be interesting to find out if variables which differentiate Filipinos from each other (such as ethnic origin, educational attainment, employment and income status, religious affiliation, etc.) would be associated with differences in views regarding democracy (and related phenomena such as leadership and the role of the military in our political system) and social capital and trust; or whether Filipinos hold common values regardless of the aforementioned differences. 

It may be an opportune time to examine the relevant survey data.


FM in his 1986 inauguration

A defiant President Ferdinand Marcos in the morning of February 25, 1986, hours before he was spirited away from the Presidential Palace by USAF helicopters


To be continued…



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Agpalo, Remigio. 1973. The organic-hierarchical paradigm and politics in the Philippines. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press.

Alagappa, Muhtiah. 1995. Political legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The quest for moral authority. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.

Bayart, Jean-Francois. 1993. The state in Africa: The politics of the belly. London: Longman.

Bratorry, M. and N. Van de Walle. 1994. “Neopatrimonial regimes and political transition in Africa.” World Politics 46(4): 453-489.

Brown, Paula. 1990. “Big Man, Past and Present: Model, Person, Hero, Legend.” Ethnology 29(2): 97-115.

Clapham, Christopher. 1982. Patronage and Political Power. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Curato, Nicole, ed. 2017. A Duterte Reader: Critical Essays on the Early Rodrigo Duterte Presidency. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

De Dios, Noel. 2008. Institutional Constraints on Philippine Growth. UP School of Economics Discussion Paper No. 0806.

Ellen, Roy. Ed. 2011. Modern Crisis and Traditional Strategies: Local Ecological Knowledge in Island Southeast Asia. Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books.

Hagesteijn, Renee and Piet van de Velde. 1996. Private politics: A multi-disciplinary approach to “Big-Man” systems. Leyden: Brill.

Heydarian, Richard. 2018. The Rise of Duterte: A Populist Revolt against Elite Democracy. London: Palgrave Pivot.

Ileto, Rey C. 2007. Magindanao, 1860-1888: The career of Datu Utto of Buayan. Manila: Anvil Books.

Kathirithamby-Wells, J. 1986. “Royal Authority and the “Orang Kaya” in the Western Archipelago, circa 1500-1800.” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 17(2): 256-267.

Kulke, Hermann. 1986. “The Early and the Imperial Kingdom in Southeast Asian History.” In Southeast Asia in the 9th to the 14th centuries. Ed. David Marr and Anthony Milner. Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 1-22.

Lande, Carl. 1964. Leaders, Factions, and Parties: the Structure of Philippine Politics. Monograph No. 6. New Haven: Yale University — Southeast Asia Studies.

McCoy, Alfred. 1999. An Anarchy of Families: Family and State in the Philippines. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

Sahlins, Marshall. 1963. “Poor Man, Rich Man, Big-Man, Chief: Political Types in Melanesia and Polynesia.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 10(3): 285-303.

Sidel, John. 1999. Capital, Coercion and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines. Stanford University Press.

Simbulan, Dante. 2005. The Modern Principalia: The Historical Evolution of the Philippine Ruling Oligarchy. Quezon City: UP Press.

Soenarno, Radin. 1960. “Malay Nationalism, 1896-1941.” Journal of Southeast Asian History 1(1): 1-28.

Strathern, Andrew. 1980. The rope of moka: Big-men and ceremonial exchange in Mount Hagen, New Guinea. Cambridge University Press.

Windybank, Susan and Mike Manning. 2003. “Papua New Guinea on the Brink.” Issue Analysis No. 30 <> March 30, 2011.

Wolters, O. W. 1999. History, Culture and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives, rev. ed. Ithaca, New York: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications in cooperation with Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.