Posts Tagged ‘International political economy’


“The changing triangular relations between the Philippines, the United States and the People’s Republic China: From Obama, Aquino, and Xi and beyond”

 

Amado M. Mendoza, Jr. and Richard Javad Heydarian

Part IV

Philippines flag

Chinese flag

The dragon and the carabao

                                   

Philippine-China bilateral ties have been far from monolithic, perhaps representing one of the most volatile inter-state relationships in recent memory. Today, the Philippines is seen as one of the most vociferous and outspoken critics of China’s maritime assertiveness in East Asia. And it has, much to the chagrin of its giant neighbor, taken the unprecedented decision to use third-party arbitration, under the aegis of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to push back against China’s sweeping claims and ever-expanding para-military patrols across the South China Sea.

Less than a decade earlier, however, the two countries enjoyed a highly cordial relationship, anchored by institutionalized security dialogue, large-scale trade and investments deal, and various confidence building measures (CBMs) aimed at managing their territorial disputes. A mono-causal explanation of the evolution of Philippine-China ties obfuscates the complex interplay of multiple factors in shaping their bilateral relationship.  The Philippines’ relations with China have been influenced by not only major developments in the South China Sea — namely, China’s coercive assertion of its claims at the expense of the Philippines — but also the strategic predisposition of each Philippine administration as well as the broader dynamics of U.S.-China relations.

A rollercoaster relationship

As America’s oldest ally, the Philippines stood with its former colonial master throughout much of the early-Cold War period, serving as a key logistical hub during the Korean War (1950-53) as well as the Vietnam War (1955-75). The Philippines proved itself as a crucial partner in containing the spread of Communism in the Asia-Pacific theater, hosting America’s largest overseas bases in Clark and Subic, which served as the bedrock of Washington’s forward deployment presence in the region (Anderson 1999; Bello 2006; 2010).

Southeast-Asia-Political-Map-CIA-2003

Manila’s strategic proximity — if not subservience — to Washington, however, did not prevent it from reaching out to Beijing. In the 1970s, the Ferdinand Marcos administration (1965-1986) pursued a rapprochement with Chairman Mao. The Filipino strongman recognized the importance of maintaining stable relations with a powerful neighbor, which could hurt the Philippines both from without and within. On one hand, the Philippines was embroiled in a domestic counter-insurgency campaign against an increasingly powerful indigenous Communist movement.  Externally, the Marcos administration was cognizant of China’s growing ambitions in the South China Sea, as Beijing sought to eliminate South Vietnam’s presence in the Paracel chain of islands, culminating in skirmishes in 1974, and push further into the Spratly chain of islands. The Philippines was intent on making sure its presence in the Thitu Island, where it established an airstrip and advanced facilities, was not threatened by China, although robust American military presence in the Philippines served as a key deterrence.. Overall, Manila sought a modus vivendi with its Communist neighbor. Crucially, the normalization of Philippine-China ties took place within the context of a brewing détente between Beijing and Washington, as China’s paramount leader reciprocated the Nixon administration’s charm offensive. Mao and Nixon laid down the foundations of a de facto US-China alliance against the Soviet Union, which ramped up its security ties with (a newly unified) Vietnam. Both Manila and Beijing were concerned with prospects of greater Vietnamese territorial assertiveness — with Soviet assistance and against the backdrop of America’s humiliating setback in South Vietnam — in the region.

Deng Xiaoping

The rise of pragmatist leader, Deng Xiaoping, coincided with (i) the normalization of China’s ties with (American-aligned) Southeast Asian neighbors and (ii) a determined pushback against Hanoi’s ambitions in Indo-China, particularly in Cambodia, and in the South China Sea, particularly in the Spratly chain of islands where Vietnam enjoyed the most expansive presence, controlling  some twenty one (21) features. The Moscow-Hanoi axis represented a common enemy to Beijing, Manila, and Washington, who were increasingly bound together by a cynical “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” strategic mindset. Philippine-China bilateral relations also benefited from the growing sophistication of Beijing’s diplomacy. Deng Xiaoping embarked on a charm-offensive across Southeast Asia shortly after assuming power, and chose to nix long financial-logistical support to Communist insurgencies across the region; meanwhile, his protégé Jiang Zemin (1992-2002) oversaw the transformation of the Chinese diplomatic corps into a modern, articulate, and competent force, which facilitated a careful cultivation of bilateral ties with neighboring countries such as the Philippines (Graver 1992; Kurlantzick 2007; Kissinger 2011; Shirk 2007).

The end of Cold War, however, presented new challenges to Philippine-China relations. The withdrawal of American bases from the Philippines in 1992, after a wave of nationalist outcry against foreign military presence in the country, created a huge power vacuum in the region. It didn’t take long before China stepped in, coercively occupying (1994) the Mischief Reef, a feature claimed (and intermittently occupied) by the Philippines in the Spratly chain of island. By 1995, the two countries confronted a diplomatic crisis, with the Ramos administration (1992-1998) considering various measures to restrain China’s territorial opportunism and wrest back the Mischief Reef. Aside from augmenting the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), under the AFP Modernization Act of 1996, the Ramos administration assiduously mobilized a regional diplomatic offensive against China, which culminated in the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). Forged under the aegis of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the DOC provided a foundational document for a long-term management of the South China Sea disputes, discouraging claimant states from engaging in provocative, unilateral and coercive measures in the area, among other things. Crucially, it provided a basis for the negotiation of a more legally-binding Code of Conduct (COC) in the long-run. The Philippines decision to welcome back American troops, under the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), was by no means sufficient to fully deter Chinese adventurism. The VFA neither provided for the establishment of permanent, large-scale American bases in the Philippines — a non-starter on constitutional grounds — nor did it translate into unequivocal American support for the Philippines amid the Southeast Asian country’s territorial disputes with China. The Ramos administration had to place at least some of its strategic eggs in the diplomatic basket. There was no military solution to the Chinese threat.

With the entry of China into the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the emergence of the Communist power into a regional economic pivot, neighboring countries further shifted their attention to trade and investment-related issues. Now, China was primarily seen as an indispensable economic partner for many East Asian countries. And the Philippines came to saw China as a vital trading partner, too. Meanwhile, the Bush administration’s (2000-2008) pugnacious and unilateralist foreign policy began to alienate many countries in the region. Soon, many countries began to see China as a peaceful, cooperative rising power standing in stark contrast to the unilateral assertiveness of the U.S. By 2004, the Arroyo administration (2001-2010) decided to withdraw its troops from the “Coalition of the Willing” contingent in Iraq, a move that incensed Washington but bought the unpopular Filipino president desperately needed political capital at home. The move came on the heels of growing popular demand for saving a Filipino hostage (Angelo De La Cruz) held by al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in Iraq, which demanded the withdrawal of Philippine military presence in the Middle Eastern country in exchange for the hostage’s life. To pre-empt any potential reprisal from Washington, which dangled the option of reducing military and financial assistance to its Southeast Asian ally, the Arroyo administration astutely employed the ‘China card’, embarking on a high-profile state visit to Beijing, which culminated in a series of trade, security, and investment agreements. What followed was arguably the “golden age” of Philippine-China relations, as the Arroyo administration inked major Chinese investments in the country, particularly in the infrastructure sector, and explored CBMs such as the 2005 Joint Maritime Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) to manage disputes and explore joint development schemes in the South China Sea (Morada 2006; Mendoza and Heydarian 2012).

joint seismic survey

Astonishingly, even the U.S. was seemingly impressed by China’s efforts to develop cordial ties with the Philippines. For instance, in a cable entitled “More on Hu Jintao’s Visit to the Philippines”, the American Embassy in Manila was largely sanguine with Chinese president’s 2005 visit to Manila by stating: “President Hu’s charm offensive in Manila does not appear significantly different from that in other ASEAN capitals.  Better and broader bilateral ties advance regional interests, as other ASEAN members have also discovered”.[1]  In another cable, entitled “Joint Seismic Survey in South China Sea makes progress”, Washington also welcomed the JMSU agreement: “The joint seismic survey offers a good model for potential subsequent cooperation on exploration and exploitation, and fits neatly with Philippine goals of increased interaction between ASEAN and China and the promotion of confidence building measures. The true test of the cooperative spirit, however, will come when the parties may contemplate Extraction.”[2] Astonishingly, the U.S. was cautiously optimistic with respect to growing Philippine-China relations.

Bilateral ties, however, began to sour towards the twilight years of the Arroyo administration, as the Philippine Supreme Court declared the JMSU unconstitutional and a series of corruption scandals rocked Philippine-China joint ventures, particularly the NBN-ZTE project. The election of a new Filipino leader paved the way for a qualitative shift in bilateral relations. Presenting his agenda as a moral crusade against corruption (and his successor), Benigno Aquino III was bound to be more circumspect vis-à-vis large-scale Chinese investments in the country. The 2008-09 Global Financial Crisis also took a toll on bilateral trade, which reached as high as $30 billion in 2007 but significantly shrank (and shifted in China’s favor) in succeeding years (Mendoza & Heydarian 2012). Bilateral ties were further embittered by growing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, particularly in 2010 and 2011. The Philippines had to suspend its oil exploration activities in the Reed Bank due to Chinese harassments. No wonder then, the Philippines began to openly embrace the Obama administration’s Pivot to Asia (P2A) policy, with a primary focus on augmenting America military footprint in the region. Philippine Foreign Secretary Alberto del Rosario (a former ambassador to Washington) stood as among the most enthusiastic supporters of P2A in Asia, pushing for an upgraded Philippine-U.S. security alliance (against China).

SFA Albert del Rosario

Nonetheless, there were several attempts by the Aquino administration to prevent a breakdown in bilateral relations, particularly his highly-controversial refusal to attend the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony in 2010 for Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo as well as his high-profile visit to Beijing in 2011. But the Scarborough Shoal crisis in mid-2012 — pitting a Filipino frigate against an armada of Chinese coast guard vessels, and subsequently unleashing Chinese economic sanctions against the Philippines — led to an effective breakdown in bilateral relations. Attempts at backdoor channel diplomacy heavily backfired, leading to acrimonious blame games between Filipino officials and legislators, China refusing to disengage from the contested feature and proceeding with cordoning of the whole area. The Philippines’ decision to initiate compulsory arbitration against China in early-2013 heavily undermined prospects for better bilateral relations under the Xi Jinping administration (2012-2022), which has shown even greater determination to consolidate Chinese claims in the South China Sea. The Aquino administration’s often incendiary rhetoric against China and its decision to welcome greater American rotational military presence in the Philippines, under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), also discouraged Chinese leaders, from President Xi to Premiere Li Keqiang and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, from holding even a single high-level dialogue with their Filipino counterparts.

With Filipino officials accusing China of acting like a “bully” and Beijing returning the favor by accusing the Philippines of acting like a “troublemaker”, bilateral relations entered their darkest period in recent memory. As far as the South China Sea disputes are concerned, China holds the upper hand. It is highly unlikely that there will be any significant respite in the ongoing bilateral diplomatic deadlock until a new Filipino leadership, with a more pragmatic streak and subtle diplomatic language, takes over in 2016.

________________________________

Notes:

[1] Cable retrieved from the Wikileaks site, see https://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/05/05MANILA2174.html#

[2] Cable retrieved from the Wikileaks site, see http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06MANILA4848_a.html


“The changing triangular relations between the Philippines, the United States and the People’s Republic China: From Obama, Aquino, and Xi and beyond”

 

Amado M. Mendoza, Jr. and Richard Javad Heydarian

Part III

It’s complicated between the new frenemies!

Relations between the United States and China were rebooted more than four decades ago when diplomatic relations were re-established between the two powers.  While initial relations between the two were predictably frosty, even hostile (as evident in the Korean war of the early 1950s), the fissures between erstwhile communist comrades afforded the strategic opportunity for the United States to partner with China versus the Soviet Union.  China gained a lot from the normalization though the dimensions were not apparent at the time.  While China gained entry into the United Nations Security Council at Taiwan’s expense as a consequence, the contrasting fates between it and the Soviet Union reveal the full extent of the paybacks.  While the Soviet Union disappeared into the pages of history in the early 1990s, China proved to be the greatest beneficiary of a Western-induced globalization that needed access to China’s relatively cheap labor force and extensive markets created by growing economic prosperity.

Barack Obama

Realist thinkers have long emphasized the tensions and conflict generated by a rising power that will inevitably seek to challenge an extant hegemon.  Complementing Organski’s theories on power transition, Mearsheimer (2001) argued that great powers are not content with existing power but seek hegemony instead for their security.  This is so since they cannot know how much power is enough for present and future needs.  For this compelling reason, Mearsheimer believes that great powers will strive for hegemony now and eliminate the possibility of challengers to best ensure their security.  He also notes however that a state cannot attain global hegemony since the too many oceans can effectively stop power.  States can only achieve regional hegemony   In the most recent update of his treatise, Mearsheimer (2014 and 2014a) elaborates that a rising China will seek to dominate Asia, while the United States, determined to remain the world’s sole regional hegemon, will go to great lengths to prevent that from happening.

Current headlines seem to indicate the verity of Mearsheimer’s words.  Nonetheless, his views are not shared by American IR theorists and practitioners.  The realist par excellence and the grand strategist who helped US President Richard Nixon re-establish ties with China, Henry Kissinger, wrote these words of caution:

An explicit American project to organize Asia on the basis of containing China or creating a bloc of democratic states for an ideological crusade is unlikely to succeed—in part because China is an indispensable trading partner for most of its neighbors. By the same token, a Chinese attempt to exclude America from Asian economic and security affairs will similarly meet serious resistance from almost all other Asian states, which fear the consequences of a region dominated by a single power. The appropriate label for the Sino-American relationship is less partnership than “co-evolution.” It means that both countries pursue their domestic imperatives, cooperating where possible, and adjust their relations to minimize conflict. Neither side endorses all the aims of the other or presumes a total identity of interests, but both sides seek to identify and develop complementary interests (Kissinger 2011).

An opposite view is held by liberal institutionalists.  Liberals argue that China’s membership in international organizations such as the United Nations, World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank has brought benefits and has acculturated China to accept the existence of these same institutions.  In this sense, China is not really an out-and-out revisionist power seeking to alter the world order and institutions.

Whether one is a realist or a liberal theorist, it cannot be denied that economic relations between the two states have grown immensely over the past decades.   A US Congressional Research Service paper (Morrison 2015) reports that U.S.-China economic ties have expanded substantially over the past three decades. Total U.S.-China trade rose from $2 billion in 1979 to $592 billion in 2014.  China is currently the United States’ second-largest trading partner, its third-largest export market, and its biggest source of imports. China is estimated to be a $350 billion market for U.S. firms, based on U.S. direct and indirect exports to China and sales by U.S.-invested firms in China. Many U.S. firms view participation in China’s market as critical to staying globally competitive. General Motors (GM), for example, which has invested heavily in China, sold more cars in China than in the United States each year from 2010 to 2014.  In addition, U.S. imports of low-cost goods from China greatly benefit U.S. consumers, and U.S. firms that use China as the final point of assembly for their products, or use Chinese-made inputs for production in the United States, are able to lower costs. China is the largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasury securities ($1.24 trillion as of December 2014).  China’s purchases of U.S. government debt help keep U.S. interest rates low.

Despite growing commercial ties, the bilateral economic relationship has become increasingly complex and often fraught with tension. From the U.S. perspective, many trade tensions stem from China’s incomplete transition to a free market economy. While China has significantly liberalized it’s economic and trade regimes over the past three decades, it continues to maintain (or has recently imposed) a number of state-directed policies that appear to distort trade and investment flows. Major areas of concern expressed by U.S. policymakers and stakeholders include China’s relatively poor record of intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement and alleged widespread cyber economic espionage against U.S. firms by Chinese government entities; its mixed record on implementing its World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations; its extensive use of industrial policies (such as financial support of state-owned firms, trade and investment barriers, and pressure on foreign-invested firms in China to transfer technology in exchange for market access) in order to promote the development of industries favored by the government and protect them from foreign competition; and its policies to hold down the value of its currency.  Many U.S. policymakers argue that such policies negatively impact U.S. economic interests and have contributed to U.S. job losses.

Chinese President Xi Jinping takes part in a meeting with his French counterpart at the Elysee Palace in Paris, on March 26, 2014 in Paris. Xi was set today to sign a series of major business deals on the second day of a lavish state visit to France.  Xi is on his first-ever European tour and after visiting The Netherlands and France will head to Germany and Belgium.   AFP PHOTO POOL CHRISTOPHE ENA

How important is China in economic terms, especially to the United States?  China has 1.36 billion people, the largest national population in the world. Its economy produced $17.63 trillion in 2014, (based on purchasing power parity), making China the world’s largest economy. The European Union is second at $17.61 trillion, while the United States fell to third place with $17.61 trillion.  However, China is still a relatively poor country. Its economy only produces $12,900 per person, compared to the GDP per capita of $52,800 for the United States.  This allows China to pay its workers less, making its products cheaper, which lures overseas manufacturers to outsource jobs there.  China became the world’s largest exporter in 2013. It exported $2.21 trillion of its production, beating the EU, at $2.173 trillion and the U.S., at $1.575 trillion.   China ships 17% of its exports to the U.S., creating a $315 billion trade deficit in 2012.  China does a lot of manufacturing for foreign corporations, including American firms.  In effect, a lot of China’s exports are actually for American companies for American consumers (Amadeo 2015a).

In addition, China is the largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasury bills, bonds and notes[1]. As of May 2015, China owned $1.27 trillion in US treasuries. This amount is a little over one-fifth (or 20.8%) of the $6.1 trillion public debt held by foreign countries (U.S. Treasury 2015).  Owning U.S. treasuries helps China by keeping its yuan weaker vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, which in turn makes its exports competitive and creates jobs for the Chinese working people.  Specifically, the Chinese hold their currency, the yuan, at a fixed rate compared to a basket of currencies, mainly comprised by the US dollar.  When the dollar falls in value, China buys U.S. treasuries which increases the demand for the dollar and appreciates its value.  On the other hand, the sale of public debt to China allows the U.S. economy to grow by way of increased federal government programs.  This is especially important as the U.S. had been facing budget (albeit shrinking) deficits in recent years (Timaraos 2015).

China’s role as America’s largest banker obviously gives it some political leverage.  Every now and then, China threatens to sell part of its debt holdings. It knows that if it did, U.S. interest rates would rise slowing U.S economic growth.  China does this whenever the U.S. allows the value of the dollar to drop, which makes the debt China holds less valuable.  It is not an unalloyed weapon at the hands of the Chinese, however.  China would not call in its U.S. debt all at once. If it did so, the demand for the dollar would drop like a rock. This dollar collapse would disrupt international markets worse than the 2008 financial crisis. China’s economy would suffer along with everyone else’s.  More likely, China would slowly begin selling off its Treasury holdings. Even when it just warns that it plans to do so, dollar demand starts to drop. This hurts China’s competitiveness, as it raises its export prices, so U.S. consumers start buying U.S.-made products instead. China must further expand its exports to other Asian countries, and increase domestic demand, before it can call in its U.S. debt holdings.  (Amadeo 2015a and Amadeo 2015b).

The extended discussion above illustrates how economically co-dependent the U.S. and China had become in recent years.  This complicates the strategic relationship between the two powers.  In a way, the post-modern and hip concept of being ‘frenemies’ is apropos for both states.  This unprecedented relationship sharply contrasts the US-Soviet relationship during the Cold War.  Notwithstanding the détente period, the enmity between the two is undeniable.  In no way were both powers dependent on each other economically as trade and economic exchanges between the two were largely circumscribed by strategic considerations.  Embargos and trade controls were imposed by the U.S. and its European allies on the Soviet Union.  The basic idea is to prevent the Soviets from strengthening themselves through trade with the West.  No such similar inhibitions informed the U.S. China economic relations.

Both states realize this co-dependence and seek to leverage the fact to each other’s advantage.  From the American viewpoint, China has to weigh the consequences of recklessness and the possible loss of the opportunities and advantages of behaving responsibly within the context of U.S.-led international regime.  On the Chinese side, meanwhile, they seek to find out how much the envelope could be pushed before the Americans decide that strategic considerations are weightier than economic consequences.  The situation is one where two powers need each other but are mindful of power balance between them.  Obviously, being ‘frenemies’ is more complicated and less straightforward than being outright foes.  This dynamic is bound to prevail for decades to come.

_______________

Note:

[1] The U.S. debt is the sum of all outstanding debt owed by the Federal Government. It’s greater than $18 trillion, and is tracked by the national debt clock. America’s debt is the largest in the world for a single country. It runs neck and neck with that of the European Union, which is an economic union of 28 countries. Nearly two-thirds is the public debt, which is owed to the people, businesses and foreign governments who bought Treasury bills, notes and bonds (Amadeo 2015c).


Statement of Solidarity with the People and Government of Greece: “Your Struggle is Our Struggle”

We, the undersigned, stand in solidarity with the people of Greece and the Syriza-led government as they prepare for a referendum on July 5, 2015 on whether to accept the continuation of the program of neoliberal austerity or chart a new course free from the debilitating stranglehold of the “troika” – the International Monetary Fund, the Eu- ropean Central Bank, and the European Commission.

We support the call of Syriza for a ‘no vote’ as the only option for the people of Greece, especially the working classes, to assert sovereign control over the country’s economy and their own future.

We condemn the “troika” and their allied political institutions, for forcing their policies of neoliberal austerity, privatization, deregulation, and savage cutbacks dismantling the public sector. We, therefore, hold the “troika” responsible for the massive unemployment, increased poverty, greater social inequality, and a severe economic depres- sion now being experienced by Greece. The irony of it all is that the huge debts the “troika” is demanding for repayment did not go to Greece but were used to repay private sector creditors such as French and German banks. In other words, these are onerous and illegitimate debts.

We had welcomed the election of the Syriza-led government on a program committed to ending the neoliberal-austerity policies imposed by the EU creditors and we stand in solidarity with them as they struggle to implement an anti-austerity program.

The austerity program has been assessed as a colossal failure by leading economists worldwide. Despite this, the insistence of the EU creditors and their political and eco- nomic allies to resuscitate this failed program, can only be construed as a cynical po- litical maneuver whose real aim is to bring down the Syriza government, the first anti- neoliberal, anti-austerity government to be popularly elected in Europe.

http://inthesetimes.com/article/18020/joseph-stiglitz-thomas-piketty-greece-syriza-austerity

http://theconversation.com/the-real-question-being-asked-of-greek-voters-in-the-referendum-44203

Syriza was a product of the mass movements’ and working people’s struggles against neoliberal austerity promoted by unbridled capitalism. Similar political organizations have arisen across Europe, such as Podemos in Spain, a product of the anti-austerity ‘indignados‘ movement.

The specter that haunts the European capitalist class is a ‘Syriza syndrome’ spreading to other parts of Europe, particularly in Spain, with the election of an anti-neoliberal Podemos government. By bringing down the Syriza government, the capitalist hydra aims to strangle such a movement at its birth.

Peoples from all over the world, in both developing and developed countries, have been struggling for the past decades against the imposition of a whole range of neo- liberal measures – liberalization, deregulation, and privatization, including neoliberal austerity programs imposed by capitalist governments led by the US and its allies, through the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other financial institutions.

There has also been a long history of struggles against debt repayments and for the cancellation of odious and illegitimate debts. The world has experienced how debt burdens and neo-liberal impositions have created havoc on economies, depleted nat- ural resources, exacerbated inequalities, and impoverished peoples while siphoning off billions of dollars to global capitalist banks, giant corporations and imperialist governments.

We welcome the people of Greece into the struggle of peoples of the global South against neoliberalism, onerous debts and austerity.

Your struggle, is our struggle. Your victory, is our victory.

3 July 2015

Signatories

Individuals:

Eduardo C. Tadem, Ph.D., Professor, University of the Philippines

Reihana Mohideen, Ph.D., Transform Asia

Ric Reyes, Philippines

Sonny Melencio, Chair, Partido Lakas ng Masa (PLM) – Philippines

Jean Enriquez, World March of Women

Mary Ann Manahan, Focus on the Global South, Philippines

Joseph Purugganan, Focus on the Global South, Philippines

Josua Mata, SENTRO, Philippines

Lidy Nacpil,  Asian Peoples Movement on Debt and Development

Manarishi Dhital, Editor Janadesh Weekly and socialist activist, Nepal

Cora Valdez Fabros, STOP the War Coalition, Philippines

Isagani Serrano, President, Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM)

Amado Mendoza Jr., PhD., Professor, University of the Philippines

Teresa Encarnacion Tadem, Ph.D., Professor, University of the Philippines

Joseph Anthony Lim, Ph.D., Professor, Ateneo de Manila University

Jafar Suryomenggolo, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Kyoto University

Edru Abraham, Professor (ret), University of the Philippines

Jerik Cruz, Graduate Institute for International and Development Studies, Geneva

Teodoro Mendoza, Ph.D., Professor, University of the Philippines

Anuradha M. Chenoy, Ph.D., Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University

Kamal Mitra Chenoy, Ph.D., Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University

Darwis Khudori, Ph.D., Associate Professor, University of Le Havre

Annabelle Benedicto Bonje, De La Salle University, Philippines

Francisco Nemenzo, Former President and Professor Emeritus, University of the Philippines

Ana Maria R. Nemenzo, Campaign for a Life of Dignity for All (KAMP)

Edmund Landrito, Arya Progresibo

Mercy Fabros, WomanHealth, Philippines

Omi Royandoyan, Centro Saka, Inc. (Center for Rural Development Studies)

Michael Treen, national director Unite Union, Aotearoa/New Zealand

Marcela Olivera, Red Vida, Bolivia

Benjamin Quinones, Jr., Ph.D., Executive Coordinator, Intercontinental Network for the Promotion of Social Solidarity Economy (RIPESS-Asia)

Fatima Gay Molina, Center for Disaster Preparedness (CDP-Philippines)

Janus Isaac Nolasco, University Researcher, University of the Philippines

Aries Arugay, Ph.D., Associate Professor, University of the Philippines

Krishna Kumar KK, Kerala Sastra Sahitya Parishad (KSSP-India)

Maria Luisa Torres, PhD., Professor, Ateneo de Manila University

Maria Dulce F. Natividad, Ph.D., University of the Philippines

Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, Ph.D., University of Tsukuba

George Aseniero, Dapitan, Philippines.

Chibu Lagman, Independent journalist

Chris White, socialist, former Secretary of the United Trades and Labor Council of

South Australia

Sam Wainwright, Socialist Alliance City Councillor for Fremantle, Western Australia

Sue Bolton, Socialist Alliance City Councillor for Moreland, Victoria, Australia

Tim Gooden, Secretary, Geelong Trades Hall Council, Victoria, Australia

Darcey O’Callaghan, USA

Marta Harnecker, writer, Chile

Michael Lebowitz, Professor Emeritus of Economics, Canada

Saturnino Borras, Jr., Ph.D., Professor, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague

Nicole Curato, Ph.D., Post-doctoral Fellow, University of Canberra

Roland Simbulan, Professor, University of the Philippines

Francis Loh Kok Wah, Ph.D., Professor, Universiti Sains Malaysia

Samuel Lee, Ph.D., Secretary General, Korean National Commission for UNESCO

Kinhide Mushakoji, Ph.D., Professor, Osaka University of Economics and Law

Naruemon Thabchumpon, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Chulalongkorn University

Carl Middleton, Ph.D., Lecturer, Chulalongkorn University

Eduardo T. Gonzalez, Ph.D., Professor (ret), University of the Philippines

Kho Tungyi, Ph.D., Lecturer, Lingnan University (Hongkong)

Wei Xiaoteng, Ph.D., Professor, South China Normal University

Temario Rivera, Ph.D., Professor (ret), University of the Philippines

Jean Franco, Ph.D., Associate Professor, University of the Philippines

Fred Chiu, Ph.D., Professor, National Taiwan University

Rudi Hartono, editor Berdikari Online

Yvonne Miller Berlie, Third World Network

Nick Dearden, Global Justice Now,  UK

Caroline Sy Hau, Ph.D., Professor, Kyoto University

Lisandro E. Claudio, Ph.D., Postdoctoral Fellow, Kyoto University

Lin Shenjing, New International, Taiwan

Hansley Juliano, Lecturer, Ateneo de Manila University

Organizations:

Focus on the Global South Parti Sosialis Malaysia (PSM)

Socialist Alliance, Australia

Marxist Student Federation, Philippines

Socialist Aotearoa/New Zealand

Alab Katipunan, Philippines

Asian Regional Exchange for New Alternatives (ARENA)

Alternative ASEAN Network (ALTSEAN)

Liga ng Makabagong Kabataan, (LMK-Philippines)

Partido Lakas ng Masa-PLM, Philippines

Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC)

FDC-Southern Mindanao

Awami Workers Party, Pakistan

Aniban ng Manggagawa sa Agrikultura, Philippines

Partido ng Manggagawa (PM)

Resistance, Young Socialist Alliance, Australia

Blue Planet Project, Canada

Council of Canadians

Asian Peoples Movement on Debt and Development

SANLAKAS, Philippines

SANLAKAS –Mindanao

Bukluran ng Manggagawang Pilipino-BMP, Philippines

Partai Rakyat Demokratik, Indonesia

Social Action for Change, Cambodia

SustainUs, USA

Global Justice Now, UK Earth in Brackets

South Asia Alliance for Poverty Eradication (SAAPE)

LDC Watch

Indian Social Action Forum (INSAF)

People’s Alliance in Central East India (PACE-India)

Bangladesh Krishok Federation

EquityBD, Bangladesh

Coastbd, Bangladesh

VOICE, Bangladesh

Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum

All Nepal Peasants Federation

Rural Reconstruction Nepal (RRN), Nepal

Joint Preparatory Committee on Tax and Fiscal Justice (JPCTFC), Nepal

Debtwatch Indonesia

KRUHA Indonesia

LILAK (Purple Action for Indigenous Women’s Rights)

Our Rivers, Our Life ( OROL)-Philippines

Gitib, Inc – Philippines

MAKABAYAN-Pilipinas

ALIRAN (Malaysia)


Introduction to IPE (short version)


Overview of IPE II