What can be done to fix our nation?

It is the sad truth that a people deserve the government it gets. The poor quality of our polity is not merely or mainly due only to the poor quality of our politicians and bureaucrats but also due to the steady degradation of the quality of our own people and citizens most of which may be mired in the daily grind of making ends meet.

I speak as a senior citizen whose interest in politics and governance started decades ago–in my grade school years.

However, I also notice a similar lack of civic spiritedness and concern about the common weal among comfortable people thus material poverty may not be the cause for apathy. It is poverty of the human spirit.

Studying the history of other peoples, it seems that great shocks such as international war, revolution, and extensive natural disasters provide defining moments for a nation to unite and put its house in order. Should it come to that?

Reflecting on our own experience, I note that we have yet to unify around key ‘boundary’ questions:

1).

WHO/WHAT ARE WE?

Filipino?

Bangsa Moro?

Ilokano?

Bisaya?

midget Americans?

brown Chinese?

2).

WHERE DO WE LIVE?

 

Treaty of Paris limits?

plus the West Philippine archipelago?

plus the Philippine Rise?

 

3).

HOW DO WE CHOOSE OUR LEADERS?

Elections?

Coup d’etat?

People power?

Vote buying/selling?

Armed violence?

Rizal warned earlier that there are no tyrants unless there are slaves. Politics is really a relationship. Most of our despicable politicians were (sadly) elected into office. We are also complicit in the corruption of state officials and institutions. True, there are pathologies and imperfections in our instititutions. But these pathologies have long been analyzed and sensible solutions had been proposed. Why can’t we as a people adopt these solutions?

Is it because of the opposition of an intransigent political elite?

But then, who is truly sovereign?

Aren’t they our servants?

Or what we have here in the Philippines is an electoral oligarchy pretending to be a full-blooded democracy?

And that, we do not have what it takes to fix our house?

Comments. questions, and reactions are most welcome.

body politics, ver. 1.2

In December last year, a humiliated fruit vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, burned himself and sparked what is now known as the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia that sent long-entrenched dictator Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, his family and cronies packing their bags and ill-gotten loot and skedaddling  to Saudi Arabia and to parts unknown after that.

And Tunisia proved to be the spark that lit the now raging prairie fire in the Arab world.  Yemen is boiling.  Jordan too. But the focus of our attention is Egypt where the thirty-year old Mubarak regime is desperately clinging to power amidst calls made gingerly by West European and US governments for the strongman to start an ‘orderly transition of power’ what ever that means.

In our neck of the woods, the intrepid Heidi Mendoza (no relations; how I wish I had) revealed in one parliamentary hearing yesterday she made a pledge with her fellow auditors that she will run naked in the streets of Manila if the Ombudsman (the special court that supposedly tries cases against corrupt and erring public officials) found the case she built against the plundering Gen. Carlos Garcia to be ‘weak’.

Heidi Mendoza at House hearing

An hour ago, the voluptuous and reportedly openly-bisexual Mocha (Margaux) Uson, model and lead singer of the eponymously-named all-female show band MOCHA GIRLS, tweeted:

MochaUson Mocha Uson

ATTN: Heidi Mendoza. You have my support. I vow to run naked with you in the street if Garcia’s case will be dismissed.

Mocha Girls

Mocha kissing her bandmate

All these ‘body movements’ from Tunisia to the Philippines recall the excellent paper presented by Dr. Vene Rallonza of the Ateneo de Manila University at last year’s annual meeting of the Philippine Political Science Association (PPSA) in Baguio City.

Vene was my student in an International Studies course that examined non-violent political struggles the world over during the 20th century.  While her classmates chose to make class presentations on such struggles as the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the march of the Sumilao farmers from Mindanao to Manila, and the protest of the Chinese youth in Tien-an-men Square in Beijing in 1989, Vene decided to focus attention on the People for Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), that band of activists who would rather wear leaves or go naked rather than wear ‘glamorous’ fur.

Vene joined me in a panel on unconventional lifestyles and politics where I also presented a paper co-wrote with my son Arlo, who is into literary theory and a member of an indie rock band on the politics of the Jologs, the Philippine version of gangsta, punk, and grunge.

We had a standing-room only audience.

PETA's 'rather go naked than wear fur' campaign

Two months after, during World Cup 2010 in South Africa, the world was treated to threats that they will run naked in the streets of their native cities.

The cellphone-on-the-chest wielding Larissa Riquelme, who is rooting for Paraguay, promised to run naked in the streets of Asuncion if her national team wins the Cup..

Larissa Riquelme

Or the coach of Argentina, the Diego Maradona of ‘the hand of God’ (in)fame(y), who made the same promise.

I guess the guys in Buenos Aires, even if elated over an Argentinian victory will prefer Larissa to do her run instead of Diego.

Maradona the bull

One may dismiss Mocha’s tweet as a blatant attempt to capitalize and ride on Heidi Mendoza’s current popularity.  Be that as it may, she has an acute sense of the great political possibilities of the body.

Today’s Inquirer carries a full-page ad paid for by a certain Jose Mari Moraza who declared himself a “soldier of truth who is one” with Heidi Mendoza “in the fight for a corruption free Philippines”.

Moraza encouraged Heidi: “Sa gitna ng tukso, pangungurakot-Huwag kang manghina at manatiling nakatutok sa tunay na layunin” (Amidst temptation and corruption, don’t weaken and stay focused on the true objective).

Burning bodies. Toppled dictators.

Naked bodies. Running bodies.

World Cup trophies?

Nah!

Convicted plunderering generals?

Hopefully, yes!

What more can I say?

And the trophy (for better or for worst? acting) goes to…

Was it just a coincidence that I blogged on military corruption earlier this month?  Was it also a coincidence that it was one and continues to be one of the most read entries of this blog?

Yesterday, we were given during the public hearings at the Senate a glimpse into the industrial anatomy of corruption within the Philippine military. Today’s Inquirer reports that a retired and ailing lieutenant colonel made a surprise appearance and “disclosed how he and his ex-bosses allegedly amassed wealth, with a large portion of the loot taken from soldiers’ salaries.”

George Rabusa, whistleblower

The retired officer, George Rabusa, named former Armed Forces chief of staff (COS) Angelo Reyes (also former secretary of defense, former secretary of the interior and local government, former secretary of environment and natural resources,   and former secretary of energy, among many other posts–all during the nine-year presidency of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo from January 2001 to June 2010) as the recipient of a ‘send-off’ (or to use the more evocative Tagalog word–pabaon) gift of “not less than” PhP 50 million (or US$1.13 million using today’s exchange rate) when he retired in 2001.

Rabusa claimed he personally delivered the cash to Reyes’s military quarters, accompanied by the then military comptroller, Lt. Gen. Jacinto Ligot,  but disclosed they had to convert the money to US dollars to reduce the bulk.

In addition to the ‘send-off” bonanza, Rabusa alleged that Reyes also received a monthly take of at least PhP 5 million ( or US$ 113,000 at today’s exchange rates) for a total of PhP 100 million (or US $ 2.26 million) in his 20 months as AFP COS.

ex-AFP chief Angelo Reyes

In addition, Rabusa also revealed a ‘welcome gift’ ( or pasalubong in Tagalog) of PhP 10 million each (or US$ 226,000) for incoming AFP chiefs Diomedio Villanueva and Roy Cimatu, who also served during the GMA presidency.

ex-AFP chief Roy Cimatu

When I was an official of the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP), the highest educational institution within the ambit of the Department of National Defense and a co-equal bureau with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), I kept hearing of these practices.  However, there were no whistle-blowers like Rabusa until yesterday.

At the same Senate hearing, Angelo Reyes, according to today’s Inquirer, did not deny Rabusa’s story, saying only: “I cannot remember accepting”  the PhP 50 million “pabaon.”

Huh?

Perhaps, the reason why he forgot is because he what he could remember are heftier bonanzas and PhP 50 million is ‘chicken feed.’

Ex-military comptroller Ligot, named by Rabusa as the one who accompanied him in the monthly delivery trips to Reyes’s quarters, similarly claimed he cannot recall them.

ex-AFP comptroller Jacinto Ligot

Again, perhaps, what he remembers are weekly or daily deliveries to more substantial and powerful ‘others?’

But since they (Reyes and Ligot) were not asked directly about these, then they will not volunteer the information.

Reyes put on a histrionic display when he asked the senators to allow him to directly question Rabusa.  Normally, a resource person like Reyes is not allowed to address a fellow guest during Senate hearings.

Reyes asked (in Filipino): “Can I ask Colonel Rabusa, if, during the time that I was chief of staff, if I became greedy? Did I ask him for anything?  Did I demand money money from him, officially or unofficially?”

When he was finally allowed to question Rabusa, Reyes asked the former if he ever interfered in the preparation and distribution of the AFP special fund–provisions for command-directed activities–the supposed source of loot for military brass.

John Grisham wrote in The Rainmaker that it is dangerous to ask a question in court or in an open public hearing if one was or did not make sure what the answer will be.  More often, he warned, you will not like the answer.

best-selling author John Grisham

This proved to be the case for Reyes.

Rabusa concurred that Reyes did not directly ask him for money or anything.  

He just reminded his former boss: “No, sir, because you delegated the function to me and (retired Lt.) Gen. (Jacinto) Ligot (former comptroller).”

Rabusa added: “The instruction that I heard directly from you before was, ‘Wag nyo lang akong papirmahin ng alanganin (Just don’t make me sign anything that would get me in trouble).”

Rabusa noted that pasalubong and pabaon were in keeping with a “tradition” in the AFP of “rewarding” its chiefs princely sums.  He admitted he was himself unclean, having received half a million pesos monthly as AFP budget officer.

Meanwhile, Reyes continued to deny he ever received funds illegally and protested, according to the Philippine Star: “It is my reputation, my name and my family that are being assaulted here.  I need to protect it.”

An obviously irked Sen. Antonio Trillanes IV, jailed for seven years for leading the failed Oakwood military mutiny in July 2003, retorted: “You no longer have any reputation to protect!”

The Oakwood mutiny was prompted, among others, by charges of corruption within the military.

Other wags observed that ‘general amnesia” was present during yesterday’s hearings as Reyes and Ligot repeatedly claimed they could not remember any instance when money was delivered to Reyes’ quarters while he was AFP chief of staff.

And that, folks, is entertainment!

Political issues re risks in infrastructure PPPs in Asia

1. 

Why do countries with less checks and balances also experience greater number of project failures?

In the general political science literature, the notion of checks and balances was considered as a powerful antidote to the abuse of power (i.e., monarchical power).  Concentration of governmental power in one person or a single group more often leads to excess and abuse.  John Locke and the American founding fathers counselled the separation of powers to decrease the likelihood of tyranny.

However if power was too dispersed among so many decision makers, it could result in indecisiveness and the lack of public order (Haggard and McCubbins 2001).

Lesser checks and balances leads to arbitrariness given that only one (or a few) make political (or policy) decisions.  Lesser checks and balances mean a lesser number of veto players.  Fewer veto players may produce decisiveness and policy flexibility (at its best) but also policy volatility at its worst (Tsebelis 1995, 1999, 2000).  An empirical study by Henisz (2004) concludes that the notion that political checks and balances that constrain decision makers’ discretion serve to limit policy volatility and thus encourage investment and economic growth.

A fewer number of veto players may lead to a larger number of project approvals.  However, it could also mean relaxation of due diligence.  When these projects are faced with macroeconomic shocks and other sources of project risk, it is again less difficult for a fewer number of decision makers to declare project failure (tariff freezing, contract renegotiation, etc.).

Another point:  Checks and balances enhances the commitment (makes it more credible) of governments (borrowers) to pay their loans and honour contracts.    

2.

Why is China more prone to freeze tariffs than ASEAN countries?

 

It must be pointed out that China is an economy transitioning from central planning to market capitalism under the auspices of an authoritarian political regime.  For this reason, ubiquitous institutions that we may take for granted in jurisdictions with a dissimilar history such as contracts, private property rights, courts, etc. are not as fully developed in China compared to it Southeast Asian neighbours.

 Specialist literature (e.g. Landry 2008) notes that China is an anomaly—it being designated as a ‘decentralized authoritarian’ polity.  Local governments in China enjoy an unprecedented degree of fiscal autonomy and devolved powers (including the power to sign contracts with private firms).  Other scholars (verify citations) suggest this was the result of a log-rolling bargain between central and local elites in the light of the painful experiences of Mao period (especially the Cultural Revolution).   Empirical literature indicates that failure of most infrastructure PPPs can be traced to the imprudent exuberance of local governments (who are apparently in a race with each other in building infrastructure).  Compounding the situation is the apparent lack of a national PPP template that could guide sub-national actors and private partners. (See Adams et al. 2006; Bellier and Zhou 2003;  Zhong et al. 2008).   

 3.

 Why does ASEAN have better project experiences than China?

 The original ASEAN-5 (Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines and Singapore) has a more extensive experience with private sector-led, mixed-economy capitalism and does not have the historical burden of China’s command economy. Consequently, these countries have comparatively better institutions supportive of infrastructure PPPs. 

 What could be investigated further is whether PPPs in the ASEAN-5 needed the imprimatur of central (or federal) authorities.  I suspect that local governments in ASEAN had lesser leeway compared to their Chinese counterparts in contracting big ticket infrastructure PPPs.  Thus, you had a greater number of veto players in ASEAN which could have resulted in greater pre-operational prudence and a more judicious sharing of project risks among central and local governments with their private partners.

 Size is another point of consideration when we try to explaining differing levels of decentralization and devolution in China and ASEAN.  Chinese local governments (esp. provinces) are equivalent to or larger than most ASEAN nations.   There is thus a greater imperative to decentralize in China than in ASEAN given these size disparities. 

4.

Why are countries with lower (higher) levels of corruption less (more) likely to freeze tariffs?

 Jurisdictions with lower levels of corruption are less likely to freeze tariffs while countries with higher levels of corruption will be more likely to freeze tariffs.  The freezing of tariffs is, among others, an opportunity for state agents to extract side payments from private contractors.  More corrupt agents are then most likely to freeze tariffs in expectation of illicit gain that could arise from tariff unfreezing or contract renegotiation.  

 5.

Why are countries with enhanced rule of law more likely to freeze tariffs?

Kaufmann et al (2009) defines ‘Rule of Law (RL)’ as “capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.”  Intuitively, one should expect that countries with enhanced RL will be less likely to freeze tariffs since the quality of contract enforcement would be high.

This empirical result is indeed a puzzler.

Could this be associated with ‘Voice’?  What were the regression results between Voice and tariff freezing?    I expect that countries with greater voice will be more likely to freeze tariffs as governments will be more responsive to noisy electorates demanding tariff freezes.

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Explanatory note: Together with the earlier blog entry on China, this particular entry is a by-product of my collaboration with Dr. Renato Reside of the UP School of Economics on the structural determinants of risks faced by infrastructure PPPs in Asia.