Archive for May, 2018

A view from Antipolo

Posted: May 17, 2018 in Antipolo

Cloud formation over Metro_LI

what can one see
with one’s restless heart
and a tired soul?



rain clouds and turbulence
or the clear skies after
the darkest storms?

gales stronger than the Furies
no match for the indomitable
spirits of an aroused people!


Dark clouds over the metro from Antipolo

14 may 2018 6:22pm

A tribute to a dear friend and comrade, Ed Maranan

Books, Movies, and Music

By Ed Maranan

(translated from Filipino by A. Jr. M. Mendoza)

One needs calm

when writing a poem.

Because a poem is not a whip

one wields firmly in order to

punish those who reneged and betrayed.

A poem is not a whip!

One needs calm

when writing a poem.

Because a poem is not twine

one uses to strangle Mr. Cheat.

One needs calm

when writing a poem.

A poem is not a whip

one wields firmly

in order to punish

those who reneged and betrayed.

A poem is not a scourge

to lash evil men.

One needs calm

when writing a poem.

A poem is not twine

one uses to hang Mr. Cheat

to tighten around

his arms and neck.

A poem is not twine

to strangle evil men.

One needs calm

when writing a poem.

A poem is not a blade

one uses to cut and thrust

View original post 143 more words

The heuristic Soviet reform GT model

Let there be three players: Agent (1) is the reformer [RF], who stakes out a ‘centrist’ (in terms of the reform and the center-republic axes) programme because of the presence of agents (2) and (3).  The second agent, Agent (2) is the conservative [CO] and the third player, Agent (3) is the would-be capitalist transformer/radical critic [CT].  Each of these three agents in the Soviet reform ‘game’ have distinct goal functions:

(5)           RF :  G (RF)


Gorbachev in first public appearance after Augist coup

The reformer personified by Mikhail Gorbachev



(6)           CO:  G (CO)


Yegor Ligachev

The conservative personified by Yegor Ligachev




(7)           CT:   G (CT)


Yeltsin atop a tank

The radical/capitalist transformer personified by Boris Yeltsin (left, holding the paper in his hands


The goal functions of these three agents could be construed as maximization problems subject to constraints.  For example, the reformist goal function, G (RF) could be written as the Ferrerite function:

(8)          G (RF) = Max RF’ = Max (F, D, E)

= Min (UI, EW, SUS)


where  RF’ is a row vector defined as:

(9)          RF’ = [C1, S1, C2e, C3e, S2e, S3e, I, T, r]



C1        =   a measure of comprehensiveness of the reform program[1] and 0 < C1 < 1

C2e     =    RF’s expectation of the extent of Agent (2), or CO’s conservative program

and 0 < C2e <1

C3e     =   RF’s expectation of the extent of Agent (3), or CT’s radical program

and 0 < C3e < 1


S2e        =   RF’s expectation of Agent (2), or CO’s political strategy

S3e        =    RF’s expectation of Agent (3), or CT’s political strategy

S1          =    RF’s political strategy for reform

I             =    measure of supportiveness of international environment and 0 < I < 1

T            =     state of available theoretical guidance and ideological support

and    r  =     residuals



In this case, maximizing RF’ means maximizing (C1, S1) subject to the {C2o, C3o, S2o, I, T, r} constraint where the C2o, C3o, S2o, and S3o are the actually observed values rather than RF’s expectations regarding the program and strategy of the two other players.  This means that there are solution values C1* and S1* equivalent to:

(10)           C1*    =   f(C2o, C3o, S2o, S3o, I, T, r)

(11)           S1*   =    g(C2o, C3o, S2o, S3o, I, T, r)


One can surmise what C1; intuitive analysis would suggest that C1 for Khrushchev would be greater than that of Brezhnev while that of Gorbachev would be greater than both.  Similarly, one can see that I for Gorbachev is greater than that of his predecessors.  If one gives a numerical value to S1, then that of Gorbachev would be numerically greater than the corresponding value for Khrushchev.  The same would be true for the T variable.


The goal functions of the two other agents could be cast similarly as constrained maximization problems.  The contents of their goal functions will contain similar C2, C3, S2, and S3 factors.  The same {I, T, r} constraint applies to all three agents.  Part of the constraint for Agents (2) and (3) will be their opponents’ political program and strategy.

Even with distinct goal functions, one can conceive of all three agents participating in a political game of gathering the broadest support and amassing the maximum amount of resources and personnel to prevail and implement their respective programs.  It seems realistic to assume, given the Soviet situation during the early and peak phases of the Gorbachev reform period that most likely not a single agent can win.  In this case, two-person coalitions must and will be formed for a winning program to be adopted.  Such a winning program will obviously be a compromise.


Should Agents (1) and (2) coalesce against Agent (3) and win, the solution values to the game will be represented by C1,2* and S1,2* equivalent to:

(12)         C1,2*   =   h(C3o, S3o, I, T, r)

(13)         S1,2*   =    i(C3o, S3o, I, T, r)

C1,2* could be construed as the political compromise forged between Agents (1) and (2) while S1,2* is their joint strategy versus Agent (3).  The compromise between these two agents could be anywhere between scenarios II and II outlined below.  Perhaps the reformer (RF) will get some leeway for the operation of market forces while the conservative gets assured that the constitutional guarantee for the communist party’s monopoly of power remains.[2]


We can likewise work out similarly-structured solution values for coalitions between Agents (1) and (3) and between Agents (2) and (3).


If, as had actually happened (after the defeat of the August 1991 coup), Agent (3) opposed a coalition of Agents (1) and (2) and won, the relevant solution values are represented as:

(14)        C3* =   j(C1,2o, S1,2o, I, T, r)

(15)        S3* =    k(C1,2o, S1,2o, I, T, r)


The games that these three agents played were asymmetric PDs.  This point could be seen if we subdivide the over-all game into 2-person sub-games.  In the contest between the reformer and the conservative, the reformer can only choose amongst the following options: compete, neutralize, compromise, or surrender.  However, as economic reformer, he could not possibly cooperate with the conservative for whatever reason.  As it turned out, he could do so but not as an economic reformer but as a Soviet national or citizen.


In contrast, aside from the above options, the conservative may cooperate with the reformer on the basis of altruism and/or an extended notion of rationality.  The asymmetry can be seen also in their pay-offs.  For the reformer, his positive and negative pay-off is quite discernible.  From the conservative’s point of view, it is only his negative pay-off (in the event of the reformer’s triumph) that is clear.  He loses power, perks and privileges.  He is not sure what positive pay-offs are in store for him under a reformist regime.  The positive pay-offs may only exist in the form of side-payments the reformist makes in his behalf to buy the conservative’s cooperation, or at least, his neutrality.


When I first wrote this essay in September 1991, before the demise of the Soviet state, I listed the following equilibrium solutions, or outcomes of these Soviet games below:

I.    No or very cosmetic change (classic Stalinism): CO wins

II.   Radical economic reform without democratization: RF and CO coalition wins

III.  Democratization without significant economic reform: RF and CT coalition wins

IV.   Democratization with substantial economic reform: RF and CT coalition wins

V.    Transformation into capitalism (of the social democratic type?): CT wins

VI.   Stalemate (this is an uneasy position and will not last)


During the last phases of the Gorbachev period, the Soviet game degenerated into a two-person non-cooperative zero-sum game between the conservatives and the radicals.  The political centrist position became increasingly unviable and Gorbachev, erstwhile the consummate centrist, became more and more identified with conservatism (especially when the fate of the Soviet state hung on the balance) against the decentralizing and secessionist radicals.  Gorbachev gave more weight to the goal of keeping the Soviet Union as a single state even at the expense of economic reform, violence, and deaths.


In the aftermath of the August 1991 coup initiated by the conservatives (obviously a betrayal of the Gorbachev-Ligachev coalition), the center-republican axis apparently emerged as the principal determinant of Soviet game outcomes.  The possible ‘solutions’ along this line were: (a) continued existence of the old Soviet Union (already made moot by the independence of the Baltic states); (b) a new, looser union composed of the 12 remaining republics each of which would have greater autonomy in deciding internal political and economic mechanisms; and (c) break-up and the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a state.  As it turned out, the Soviet Union indeed disappeared.


The Soviet Union’s demise suggests that the economic reform question is without a solution.[3]  For this reason, the contest shifted dramatically and suddenly to the question of maintaining the Soviet Union as a unified federal state.  Such a question was resolved in favor of the radicals and the Soviet state died as a result.


To be continued…


Next post: The political contenders in the Philippines and the games they play


               [1] Again, this reform program is comprehensive and incorporates proposals relating to the proper relationships between the federal center, Moscow, and the republics of the Soviet Union.

               [2]  Market liberalization does not require a liberal state, as evidenced by the Chinese political economy after Mao’s death in 1976.

[3]  The argument for this conclusion is still being written.


The Soviet Political Contenders and the ‘Games’ they Play


We can now specify the protagonists in the Soviet political arena.  From 1917 onwards, we can see a movement from the pluralism of the early 1920s through the consolidation of Stalinism up to the middle of the 20th century and a tentative movement back to pluralism during Gorbachev’s time.


Vladimir Lenin

Nikolai Lenin




We submit that these political processes (and contests) can be modeled heuristically as games and are amenable to game theoretic analysis.  Bacharach (1976: 34-36) indicates that whatever has the following four (4) elements is a game:

  • Element (1). A well-defined set of possible courses of action for each of a number of players.
  • Element (2). Well-defined preferences of each player among possible outcomes of the game and among probability distributions or mixtures of outcomes.
  • Element (3). Relationships whereby the outcome (or at least a probability distribution for it) is determined by the players’ choices of courses of action.
  • Element (4). Knowledge of all of these by all of the players.


In real life, certain activities are to be found to resemble games in terms of the above elements.  All of the four elements are certainly restrictive; any deviation from any of them weakens the applicability of game theory.  We have no wish to deny this weakness.  Let us examine each of them.  Element (1) is primary since it establishes the ground rules for the players—that they have agreed to play , and that certain courses of action are permissible while others are not.  It also implies that when a player has to ‘search’ high and low just before he makes his decision to discover what choices he has, game theory is not entirely appropriate.


Element (2) attributes some kind of consistency to the players.  For instance, if they prefer $20 to $10, then they would also prefer a good chance of $20 rather than $10 to a poor chance of $20 rather than $10.  The third element implies that the outcome of the game cannot be affected by any outside cause other than the players’ actions, unless it is random one.  This means no conscious actor can interfere with it.  The fourth element, however, is the most restrictive of the lot.


Games could involve two or more players.  A player need not just be an individual; it could be any human grouping which can choose and act as a unit.  Games could be cooperative or non-cooperative.  A cooperative game is one which the players can cooperate (or assist each other); meaning, there is nothing (in the rules of the game) to prevent them from coming to an agreement as to what each of them will (or will not) do.  Wage bargaining and inter-state diplomacy are cooperative games while monopoly (or monopolizing, to be exact) is not.  In an n-person game, the ground rules may allow subsets of players to cooperate.  For instance, two players may coalesce against a third one in a 3-person game.


A game could be zero-sum or nonzero-sum.  If it is the former type and it involves only two players, then it is usually a non-cooperative one since the gain of one player is the exactly the loss of the other.  Their preferences are diametrically opposed and collaboration is impossible.  A zero-sum game could be modified through side-payments.  A player could yield in exchange for a pay-off coming from the ‘winning’ player.  In this case, instead of an all-or-nothing arrangement, the winner shares part of his total gains with the ‘loser’ once the latter agrees to give up the contest and yield.


Non-zero sum games are not strictly competitive games.  They may or may not be cooperative.  If and when a non-zero sum game is played non-cooperatively, it is so played because collaboration is either not permitted or impossible.


The most interesting 2-person non-zero sum, non-cooperative game is the prisoners’ dilemma (PD).  In this game, cooperation between the two players promises optimal pay-offs for both.  In a one-off transaction, however, rational expectations about each other’s actions lead both players to choose decisions (and actions) which result in inferior pay-offs for both.  Only through repetition and learning will supposedly prevent these sub-optimal outcomes.


Joseph Stalin

Joseph Stalin



Leon Trotsky

Leon Trotsky

The Soviet intramurals during the 1920s could be modeled as 3-person, zero-sum games with coalitions allowed.[1]  Nikolai Bukharin staked out a moderate ‘let the peasants decide’ industrialization strategy while Eugen (Yevgeni) Preobrazhensky and Leon Trotsky forwarded a relatively faster program based on non-voluntary extraction of surplus from the peasantry.

Nikolai Bukharin

Nikolai Bukharin


Eugen Preobrazhensky

Yevgeni Preobrazhensky

Joseph Stalin first allied with Bukharin to defeat Trotsky.  When Trotsky was disposed of, the game was transformed into a 2-person kind.  Stalin then moved against Bukharin and adopted the Preobrazhensky program of ‘primitive socialist accumulation’ after Bukharin’s elimination.


Nikita Khrushchev

Nikita Khruschev


Similarly, one can consider the contests between the reformers and the conservatives, between the adventurous and the blah and the bland during the Nikita Khrushchev (1953-1964) and Leonid Brezhnev (1964-1982) periods as 2-person games.  Sometimes, they were zero-sum while in certain instances, they were PDs.  Tentatively, one can say that the contest between Khrushchev and his political rivals (who eventually deposed him as CPSU chief) was a zero-sum game.  The political game was subsequently modified with Khrushchev receiving some pay-offs (he retained the perks of his former post) after being sacked in October 1964.



Leonid Brezhnev

Leonid Brezhnev

The cat-and-mouse game between the central planner and the enterprise management in the Soviet Union is obviously a PD.[2]  The planning process starts with statements of productive capability from the operating enterprises which then become the basis of binding plan-instructions from the center back to the productive enterprises.  The logic of the Soviet planning-incentive system forces enterprise managers to bid for lower production targets.  In anticipation, the central planners levy production targets that are substantially higher than what were submitted from below.  The results are sub-optimal for the entire economy as well as for both players.


Alexie Kosygin

Aleksei Kosygin


During the reform process initiated by Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin at the start of the Brezhnev period, asymmetric PD games were played between reformers and conservatives.  Conservatives had either the option to compete or cooperate with the reformers.  The reformers, however, had no other choice but to compete with the conservatives, at least along the reform axis.[3]  Compromises were however possible on other fronts, e.g. on the question of de-Stalinization.  These compromises usually took the form of log-rolling transactions.  Log-rolling appears to be the essence of the games played during the Brezhnevite ‘stagnation’ period.  The players were the ‘doves’ and the ‘hawks’[4] plus the economic reformers and conservatives.  Conservatives would yield to reformers on say the issue of changing industrial incentive structures in exchange for ‘reformist’ support for a massive Soviet military build-up against the Chinese.


The reign of Mikhail S. Gorbachev first appeared to be a 3-person asymmetric prisoners’ dilemma involving the conservative, the centrist reformer, and the would-be radical capitalist transformer.[5]  Again, 2-person coalitions were formed as Gorbachev flip-flopped between the radicals led by Boris Yeltsin and the conservative hardliners headed by Yegor Ligachev.  For instance, the mid-1990 post-28th party congress joint Gorbachev-Yeltsin reform communiqué was a challenge to the CPSU conservatives.  On the other hand, 1991 opened with Gorbachev allying himself with the conservatives on the Baltic problem.[6]  It appeared that Gorbachev’s concern to reform the Soviet was second only to his desire the keep the Soviet state’s territory intact.  The strong identification of erstwhile reformer Gorbachev with the conservatives as 1991 progressed transformed the Soviet game into a two-person contest between conservatives and radicals.


The conservative camp feared for its vital interests and decided to launch the August 1991 coup (including detaining Gorbachev and his entourage in a dacha in Crimea. The coup failed miserably with dire consequences not only for the conservatives but for Gorbachev and the Soviet Union as well.


Yegor Ligachev

Yegor Ligachev




A Soviet soldier loyal to the coup

A coup soldiet atop his tank in Red Square, Moscow



Yeltsin rode high with his strong opposition to the coup and manage to wrest power from a weakened Gorbachev even as the coup was crushed.

Yeltsin atop a tank

Boris Yeltsin (left, with paper in hand) on top of an armored car rallying protest against the August 1991 coup



               [1]  The Soviet economy was gripped by economic troubles—acute goods shortages, gargantuan budget deficits, and monetary imbalances in 1990.  The general availability of basic food stuffs (both in volume and kind) fell from 90% of demand in 1983 to 22% in 1989 and to 11% by mid-1990.  The imbalance between demand and supply will get reflected in higher prices.  While official statistics reported inflation rates of 2% and 5.3% for 1989 and 1990, respectively, the Soviet newspaper Izvestia maintained that inflation in 1990 was likely to be at least 18%, an unprecedented level for a country that claimed the absence of inflation.  Gorbachev and his allies tried to counter the ill-effects of inflation on citizens by foolishly raising wages and social benefits.  This populist move will wreak havoc on Soviet money supply and state finances.  The year 1988 represented the turning point as monetary incomes of the population rose by 30 billion rubles, compared to a previous annual increase of 10 billion rubles.  The increases in 1989 and 1990 were 64.5 billion rubles and 94 billion rubles, respectively (Aslund 1991).  The increased wages, not reflecting increased productivity, only abetted inflation.  Estimates of the monetary overhang (excess money in circulation) place it about 250 billion rubles (IMF et al. 1990).

[2]  The Soviet Union was essentially a multinational imperial state with Russians lording over other nationalities in the federal Soviet state, party, and military organizations.  The Soviet Union’s incorporation of the erstwhile independent Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) in 1940 was never recognized by the Western powers.  This gave Baltic nationalists hope that they would gain foreign support for their independence bids.  Most of Soviet constituent republics in Central Asia had majority Muslim populations.

[3] The new program, which embraced the market economy and abandoned traditional ideas of class identity with the proletariat, was accepted.  In presenting the program, Gorbachev told his colleagues that building communism in the Soviet Union was no longer a realistic goal and that they have to reject outdated ideological dogmas to save the CPSU (PDI 1991c).


Gorbachev in first public appearance after Augist coup

Exhuasted Mikhail Gorbachev as he was brought back to Moscow from Crimea after the August 1991 coup’s collapse


To be continued…


Part IV.  The heuristic GT model for Soviet reform





Bachrach, Michael (1976). Economics and the Theory of Games. London: Macmillan.

Mendoza, Amado Jr. (1992). “The Soviet Reform Process, 1956-1991: From Socialist Renewal to Liquidation.” MIS Thesis, University of the Philippines.



[1]  These intramurals amongst the heirs of Bolshevik leader Nikolai U. Lenin set the stage for the adoption of central planning and the end of the more liberal compromise economic program (the New Economic Policy).  The NEP itself was adopted as a corrective to the extremely harsh ‘War Communism’ resorted during the wars against internal and external enemies collectively called the White Armies.   For a fuller narration of these early political struggles in the Soviet Union, please see Mendoza (1992), particularly Chapter III, “Classic Stalinism: The Object of Reform,” pp. 67-118.

[2] See Mendoza (1992), particularly Chapter IV, “Soviet Economic Reforms under Khrushchev,” pp. 119-180; Chapter V, “The Brezhnev Period: Kosygin’s Reforms and After,” pp. 181-254; and Chapter VI, “The Andropov-Chernenko Interval,” pp. 255-275.

[3] Soon, the political contests will be played along a different axis—whether the Soviet State will survive as a multinational imperial federal state, or not.  This contest will be especially acute during the later part of the Gorbachev period (1985-1991).

[4] ‘Doves’ and ‘hawks’ were identified by their respective positions on the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, especially on the issue of strategic weapons limitations (or more precisely, the reduction of nuclear arms on both sides).  ‘Doves’ were usually economic reformers while ‘hawks’ were usually conservatives.  Later, ‘hawks’ favored a tougher stance vis-à-vis China, when the latter allied with the United States in an anti-Soviet global front after US-China relations got normalized in 1972.

[5] See Mendoza (1992), especially Chapter VII, “The Gorbachev Process: From Reform to Liquidation,” pp. 276-361.

[6] In 1990-1991, the three Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—previously independent states acquired by the Soviet Union in 1940 under the secret Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, unilaterally declared their independence from the Soviet Union.   After some dilly-dallying, Gorbachev sent troops to Vilnius, the Lithuanian capital, and the resulting violence spurred rather than smothered separatist impulses in Lithuania, the rest of the Baltics and other Soviet republics (Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova).

A Filipino Marxist, Ricardo Ferrer (1990) attempted to construct a formal mathematical model of Marxist political economy.  We use his model to illuminate and understand better the essence of the reform process in the Soviet Union and its ultimate outcome in late 1991.  After doing so, we explore the fitness of the same model in the analysis of the transit from authoritarianism in the Philippines since 1983 and beyond.


Ferrer’s model devoted attention to the Marxist propositions regarding the correspondence between so-called ‘forces of production’ and ‘relations of production’ as well as the appropriate state and/or state form.  His key insight: non-correspondence invites both reform and/or revolution.


The appropriate model is reproduced below.


Let L be the vector (L1, L2, …, Ln-1, Ln) which measures the development of the forces of production in society.[1]


We define q as the level of operation of the economy so that 0 ≤ q ≤1,

and Z as the ratio of surplus labor to total labor .


(1)                             Z = Z (L, q)


In equation (1), Ferrer notes that Z may be thought of as the surplus product per worker divided by total product per worker, where the total includes, apart from the surplus, what is considered the necessary requirement (for consumption) of each worker on the average.  This is conceptually equivalent to the Marxian notion of surplus labor divided by total labor.


By definition, 0 ≤ Z < 1; meaning, necessary labor can never be equal to zero while surplus labor can.


At all levels of the economy, some amount of unproductive but socially necessary labor is needed.  For instance, trading firms facilitate the circulation of products while financial intermediaries expedite the flow of funds from surplus cash holders to borrowers-users.  In that case, Ferrer postulates a social cost function Cu:

(2)                Cu = Cu (L, R, RS, RS’, RI’, q)



L      =  (L1, L2, …, Ln-1, Ln)

R     =  (R1, R2, …, Rn-1, Rn)

RS   = (RS1, RS2, …, RSn-1, RSn)

RS’  = RSR

RI    = (RI1, RI2, …, RIn-1, RIn)

RI’  = RIR

q =    level of operation of the economy


The variables R1 to Rn index relations of production; RS1 to RSn are the corresponding laws applicable to production relations R1 to Rn.  We would imagine that under a given state, laws would correspond to relations such that RSi = Ri (where i = 1, 2, …, n-1, n).  Similarly, RI1 to RIn are the ideological representations of the relations of production variables.  Ideally, they should also correspond wholly.  RS’ and RI’ measure deviations between actual relations of production and their legal and ideological representations.  Intuitively, we see that the larger RS’ and RI’ are, the larger the total social costs will be.


We know the last point to be true by noting that when property arrangements tend to run afoul of the law and social beliefs, it would be more costly to impose worker discipline.  In addition, if property rights are questioned, greater transactions cost will attend normal economic exchanges.  Unproductive labor will tend to be higher at all operational levels of the economy.


An efficient economy is one which is able to attain the maximum net surplus.  In that case, the economic problem is to maximize net surplus NZ which is the difference between Z and Cu by choosing the appropriate values for q, R, RS’ and RI’ given the level of development of productive forces L.  In notation, this is equivalent to

(3)          Max [Z(L, q) – Cu (L, R, RS’, RI’, q)]

{R, RS’, RI’, q}


Ferrer also shows that maximizing net surplus NZ is the same as minimizing total cost at a given level of the economy’s operation, i.e., at a given q.  This means that the social goal could also be written as

(4)           Min Cu (L, R, RS’, RI’)

{R, RS’, RI’}


Equations (3) and (4) indicate that relations of production and superstructure, laws and state action and ideology, correspond to the level of development of productive forces if they maximize net surplus NZ in society.  The object of any social reform (or revolution) is to remedy non-correspondence whenever and wherever such is present.  In case of correspondence, the social goal is to optimize the levels of L and q.  A greater reform project tries to effect correspondence as well as advance L and q simultaneously, or at least, sequentially after securing correspondence.  This appears to be Gorbachev’s intent.


The struggle for reform (or the revolutionary struggle) will be a political contest.  In such a contest, politicians of all stripes, from reactionaries to reformists to revolutionaries will participate and contend.  In such a struggle, even the variable L will be part of the political programme offered for the (s)electorate’s consideration apart from R, RS, and RI.  As Ferrer puts it: “The assumption that the development of L is entirely autonomous must be discarded, insofar as self-interest seeking men running political parties can benefit from some intervention in L, as the results of such intervention satisfies some demand, and would tend to maximize political parties’ chances of getting the reins of power” (Ferrer 1990: 106).  In other words, competing parties will offer complete programs which have political, economic, and cultural components.


To be continued…


Next part:  The Political Contenders and the Games They Play












Bova, Russell (1991). “Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition: A Comparative Perspective.” World Politics 44(1): 113-138.

Ferrer, Ricardo (1990). “A Mathematical Formalization of Marxian Political Economy.”  UP School of Economics Seminar Papers.

Mendoza, Amado Jr. (1992). “The Soviet Reform Process, 1956-1991: From Socialist Renewal to Liquidation.” MIS Thesis, University of the Philippines (ms.).

Mendoza, Amado Jr. (2009).  “’People Power’ in the Philippines, 1983–86.” In Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present, pp. 179-196. Ed. Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash. Oxford University Press. 

[1] In Ferrer’s model, there are eight (8) L variables which measure the degree of worker control over instruments of production (L1), raw materials (L2), the level of development of material instruments of production, or roughly, capital intensity (L3), level of development or processing of raw materials (L4), the level of development of labor power, which indicates the degree of substitutability between workers within enterprises (L5), within a particular economic sector (L6), within the entire economy (L7), and the level of development of economic space (L8).  Economic space, defined in Marxian terms, consists of total productive fixed capital stock (such as factory buildings, silos, roads, ports, etc.) in an economy.  All eight L variables have values between 0 and 1.  Thus, L is the vector (L1,…, L8).