Success of peace agreements and asymmetry: GPAP, Part V

Philippine military armor in Mindanao alongside civilians on a horse

While required, signing a peace agreement does not automatically keep the peace among combatants.  In truth, two agreements—the 1976 Tripoli Agreement (under President Ferdinand Marcos) and the 1987 Jeddah Accord (under President Corazon Aquino)—led nowhere.  True, there were occasional skirmishes and dissatisfaction amongst some MNLF fighters.  In addition, a key provision of the 1996 FPA, that the MNLF’s right of representation in the national government and in all organs of state—was never implemented.  Nonetheless, the 1996 FPA could be deemed a success.  Among the key indicators of success are the absence of large-scale warfare between the MNLF and government troops, the co-optation of the MNLF leadership into a pre-existing autonomous region for Muslims in Mindanao and Sulu islands, the integration of many MNLF combatants into the government’s security services, and the release of local and foreign funds for the region’s development.

Nur Misuari

However, the Asian financial crisis adversely affected the Philippine government’s capacity to provide funds and led to discontent within MNLF ranks.  To be fair to the Philippine government, MNLF leader Nur Misuari was not blameless with his profligate and biased spending.  He was continuously travelling within the country and abroad with a huge entourage and concentrated resources for his fellow-Tausogs. Ultimately, the MNLF leadership may be successful rebels but were poor administrators.

The power asymmetry against the MNLF is the bottom-line reason for the success of the peace agreement. Militarily, the MNLF had reached its peak in the 1970s and lost its fierce fighting edge.  It remained a stubborn and enduring military force (Vitug and Gloria 2000).  The MNLF cannot credibly commit to renege on the 1996 Final Peace Agreement and return to full-scale warfare since it was weakened by splits, casualties, desertions, tribal differences, etc.  Its foreign supporters and backers are not keen to support a military effort (Iribani 2006; Vitug and Gloria 2000).  In that sense, it did not have trump cards.

Even the remaining MNLF fighters were not threats credible enough for the Philippine government to offer concessions.  These combatants tried a mini-rebellion in November 2001 after Misuari lost his positions in the autonomous regional body but it was nipped in the bud.  Misuari escaped to Malaysia but was handed back to Philippine authorities by Kuala Lumpur.  Upon his return to the Philippines, he was incarcerated. In 2008, he was allowed to post bail and talks to finalize implementation of the 1996 FPA were resumed by the Arroyo and Aquino governments.

Another imbalance characterizes the relationship between the MNLF and the Philippine government.  The MNLF’s constituency expects it to produce the deliverables promised in the 1996 FPA.  If it fails to do so, the MNLF loses its political luster and its followers may gravitate to its rivals, specially the MILF.  The Philippine government is not in the same predicament.  It has already delivered a clear good–cessation of hostilities—save for a few skirmishes here and there.  That appears to be what matters most to ordinary Filipinos.  As long as hostilities do not resume, ordinary Filipinos will not normally care if the Philippine government kept its side of the bargain in the 1996 FPA.  In effect, there is greater political pressure on the MNLF than on the Philippine government.

Since 1986, both sides observed a ceasefire agreement.  So both MNLF and Philippine government troops have not fought each other for a decade before a final agreement was reached.  Agreeing to a ceasefire before a comprehensive agreement can be interpreted by the other side as a sign of weakness.

Prior to the assumption of talks to finalize implementation of the 1996 FPA, the MNLF also lost traction vis-à-vis the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) largely due to Misuari’s plummeting fortunes and splits within the organization.  With two ascendant interlocutors, Misuari’s faction played the role of heckler and spoiler.  At times, it raised bids to unify with the MILF and repair splits within the MNLF.  Heckling and spoiling are tactics of a party that feels it was being neglected by another notwithstanding an outstanding agreement.  Unification bids are attempts to enlarge the pie that will eventually be shared by Bangsamoro people.  They also used to communicate to government that it is negotiating with a stronger force.  These tactics did not help the MNLF one bit and like a chastened schoolboy, Misuari returned to talks with government.

In hindsight, it can be said that there was diminished urgency on the part of the Philippine government to fully implement the 1996 Final Peace Agreement (FPA) after it was signed in September 1996.  A good part of the MNLF leadership and fighters were incorporated into the Muslim regional bodies and government security forces.  The Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s compelled government to husband its resources carefully.  As long as Misuari and his commanders were comfortably ensconced in their offices, the MNLF will not rebel again.

President Joseph Estrada

Attention will soon be directed elsewhere–to the Moro Islamic Liberation (MILF), a split from the MNLF.  In 2000, President Joseph Estrada launched several attacks on MILF camps to shore up his sagging political fortunes in Manila.  While government troops succeeded in capturing some MILF camps, Estrada was unable to win a decisive military victory over the MILF.  Furthermore, he also enraged not a few Muslims for insensitively eating pork with government troops within the ruins of a mosque.

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

The all-out war tack of Estrada was changed by the government of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.  With Misuari was in prison and the MNLF weaken by further splits, Arroyo endeavored to have the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) controlled by warlords who could deliver votes in her favor (Lara 2010).  Arroyo concentrated in delivering a peace agreement with the MILF—the so-called MOA-AD.  When the MOA-AD was rejected by the Supreme Court, Arroyo’s government released Misuari from detention and started talks to for the final implementation of the 1996 final peace agreement (FPA).  These talks are being continued by the government of President Benigno Aquino III through the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), headed by Secretary Teresita Quintos-Deles.

Ghosts of peace agreements past, Part I

The Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) are still engaged in talks for the final implementation of the September 1996 Final Peace Agreement (FPA), some sixteen (16) years after FPA’s inking.  The FPA was signed to formally end twenty four (24) of armed hostilities between the two parties.  The relative weakness of the MNLF and the preferences of its foreign supporters in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) brought it to the negotiating table.    The MNLF, specially its Chairman Nurallaji Misuari, signed on with the FPA largely because of political side-payments.  The 1996 peace agreement was initially deemed a success with the absence of large-scale warfare, the incorporation of the MNLF leadership into a regional government (Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao), release of local and foreign funds for the region’s development, and the integration of many MNLF fighters into the military and police forces.  However, as the shortcomings of Misuari and his comrades as administrators became known, the political stock of the MNLF plummeted.  Misuari was removed as ARMM head in 2001 and his ouster ignited a failed MNLF mini-rebellion in Sulu and Zamboanga.  He was soon imprisoned and the MNLF lodged in political limbo for a number of years.  In the process, implementing the 1996 FPA took to the back-burner as the importance of a rival organization, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) rises.  Only when a peace deal with the MILF collapsed in 2008 did the Philippine government turn its attention back to the 1996 FPA.  On the agenda were the same issues—amendment of the organic act creating the regional government and suitable formulas for revenue sharing (especially from minerals)—in previous talks.  While Marvic Leonen, the chief peace negotiator of the government of President Benigno Aquino III vowed that GPH-MNLF talks will be finalized during Aquino’s term, it remains to be seen if that will come to pass. 

A Framework Agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was recently signed this month to serve as basis for subsequent negotiations between the two parties.  Already, the said agreement drew complaints from the leader of the rival Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)  Misuari who warned there will be violence if his group was ignored in the accord’s finalization.  To put things in perspective, this blog post examines the peace process between the government and the MNLF.   It focuses on the implementation of the Final Peace Agreement signed by both sides on September 2, 1996.

It is asserted that the imbalance of power against the MNLF forced it to make concession after concession to the Philippine government since the 1976 Tripoli Agreement brokered by Libya’s Moummar Qaddafi.  Ultimately, the political strength of an insurgent group is a function of its military strength.  It cannot win in the negotiating table what it cannot gain in the battlefields.  In the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, the MNLF settled for autonomy in the Southern Philippines and gave up its original goal of establishing a separate Bangsamoro state. Rubbing salt on open wounds, Marcos duplicitously established two regional governments which excluded three provinces named in the Tripoli Agreement.

Libya’s Qaddafi

After Marcos fell, the MNLF agreed to a ceasefire in 1986 with government troops without getting anything substantial from government.   Faced with the popularity of President Corazon Aquino, it protested but had to accept a dimunitive autonomous regional government in 1989-90.  The MNLF signed a final peace agreement (FPA) with the Philippine government in September 1996.  A clinical analysis of the FPA indicates that it was a one-sided agreement against the MNLF, reflective of the asymmetry of power against the MNLF.  However, the FPA was deemed a success given the absence of large-scale armed conflict, the incorporation of Misuari and other top MNLF leaders into the autonomous regional government and the integration of MNLF fighters into the government’s armed services.

After Misuari churlishly launched a mini-rebellion in 2001, the MNLF got divided into factions and Misuari’s MNLF faction went into political limbo as he was imprisoned.  His political fortunes got revived when a peace deal between the government and the rival Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) fell through.  Misuari was released and talks on the final implementation of the 1996 FPA were initiated by the government of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.  Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process Teresita Deles vowed that these implementation talks will be completed within the term of President Benigno Aquino III (2010-2016).  With the unchanged relative inferiority of the MNLF vis-à-vis government, it remains to be seen what gains it could get from these talks.  And now, the MILF seems to be the flavor of the month. The political challenge for the MNLF and Misuari is to complete its own talks with government without the use of threatening language or acts.