A new cold war in the Indo Asia-Pacific theatre

During the first day of the 3rd Katipunan Conference sponsored by the Strategic Studies Program (with which I am a fellow) yesterday, I asserted that a new cold war is on in the Indo Asia Pacific Theater.  And in fact, I am just echoing the views of very young and very junior scholars I have read way back in 2015 like Hendricks (2015)

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What was a Chinese military plane doing in South Korea’s special air defence zone for 4 hours?
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/what-was-chinese-military-plane-doing-south-koreas-special-air-defence-zone-4-fours-1664076?utm_source=social&utm_medium=facebook&utm_campaign=%2Fwhat-was-chinese-military-plane-doing-south-koreas-special-air-defence-zone-4-fours-1664076

 

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What’s going on in our neck of the woods?

A new cold war, that is!

In the Indo Asia Pacific theater with China and the US as the main protagonists.

 

An appropriate (even if old) theory that could help better understand the new East Asian strategic environment exists.  The Power Transition theory is a theory about the cyclical nature of war, in relation to power (of states) in international relations.   Created by A.F.K. Organski, and originally published in his textbook, World Politics (1958), contemporary power transition theory describes international politics as a hierarchy, with different degrees of power between states. The objective of the theory is to investigate the cyclic condition of wars, and how transition of power in terms of machtpolitik affect the occurrence of these wars.

 

The principal predictive power of the theory is in the likelihood of war and the stability of alliances.  War is most likely, of longest duration and greatest magnitude, when a challenger (a revisionist power; one of the great powers) to the dominant power (the global hegemon) enters into approximate parity with the dominant state and is dissatisfied with the existing system. Similarly, alliances are most stable when the parties to the alliance are satisfied with the system structure. This leads to the view that when the balance of power is unstable (i.e. one or two nations have taken a dominant role in geopolitics), the likelihood of war is greater.

 

According to Organski:

 

An even distribution of political, economic, and military capabilities between contending groups of states is likely to increase the probability of war; peace is preserved best when there is an imbalance of national capabilities between disadvantaged and advantaged nations; the aggressor will come from a small group of dissatisfied strong countries; and it is the weaker, rather than the stronger; power that is most likely to be the aggressor.

 

 

Using Organski’s theory, China can be characterized as a ‘revisionist’ power dissatisfied with the existing balance of forces in the world as well as in Asia.  Meanwhile, the United States is a ‘status quo’ power (or a stand patter) working to preserve its hegemony.  It is joined by other status quo powers like Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Since it does not share US interests and preferences, the Russian Federation under President Vladimir Putin is China’s natural ally.[1]  The same is true with Pyongyang since Seoul is on the opposing side.  India is in a predicament since it shares a land border with China and fought a brief border war with the latter in the 1960s.  Geopolitical realities may force India to either align with China or opt for neutrality in the conflict.

 

Thus, a new cold war is afoot in East Asia (or the eastern Pacific rim) involving great powers (both status quo and revisionists) plus their allies.

Note that Russia had agreed to sell its most advanced S-400 missile systems to China.  Please see   <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/china-and-russia-sign-contract-for-s-400-missile-systems/519010.html&gt;.

 

A similar cold war is fought between the US and the Russian Federation in, as usual the European and MENA theater.

Of course, they have proxies.

But this new cold war is quite different, qualitatively different than the Cold War between the US and the USSR that ended in 1989-1991.

China and US are not starightfoward enemies.

The US and the Soviet Union were.

China and the US are, in millenial speak, “frenemies”.

They are enemies and rivals in the strategic realm.

But even in the strategic realm, they need to cooperate so as not to blow the world up in smoke and cinders.

They are friends in the economic realm sharing interest in keeping the world economy an open one.

However, as economic powers, they also compete and rival each other.

China was and is the biggest beneficiary of contemporary globalization, of the liberalization of the world’s financial markets and FDI rules.

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Want to escape poverty? Replace pictures of Jesus with Xi Jinping, Christian villagers urged | South China Morning Post
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2119699/praise-xi-jinping-not-jesus-escape-poverty-christian

 

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In the process, the US steadily lost jobs and this gave (or gives) a fillip to protectionist sentiments exploited by Trump and his kind specially among blue collar workers and within the Rust Belt and the South.

The war is fought because of the steady undermining of the post-World War II world order.

 

The war is fought while the 4th Industrial Revolution is disrupting our lives, our economies, our ways of life, our politics, and our consciousness.

Fortunes are being made while misery and mayhem are widespread.

For this reasons, all gaps seem to be widening.

There is a great disconnect between competing truths. There is mass confusion, disaffection, and tumult.

The world is poised for a major shift.

 

The love-hate triangle, Part V

“The changing triangular relations between the Philippines, the United States and the People’s Republic China: From Obama, Aquino, and Xi and beyond”

 

Amado M. Mendoza, Jr. and Richard Javad Heydarian

Part V

What now?

None illustrates the abject poverty of the Philippine government’s current position vis-à-vis China that the just concluded seventh bilateral strategic and economic dialogue between China and the United States last June.  A glaring contrast is offered by a more powerful U.S. talking with China while the  weakest state, the Philippines, spurns talking with a powerful neighbor.   It appears that the smallest power in this triangle has put all its eggs in two baskets: the ITLOS arbitration case and an expanding security relationship with its American ally (as well as Japan).  It remains to be seen how the Benigno Aquino III administration will respond to the latest entreaty from the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines that the former drop its ITLOS case and resume the bilateral dialogue between the two states.

Even the bitterest adversaries can and should talk, and the measure of good leadership is to combine deterrence with smart engagement. After all, diplomacy is about avoiding conflict, resolving disputes, and outsmarting adversaries through means than raw brinkmanship.  We can learn from our neighbors.  The Philippines is not the only country which has territorial disputes with China.  If anything, Tokyo and Hanoi have been locked in a similar, if not fiercer, territorial show down with Beijing.  Since 2010, Japan has had to resist the ever-growing deployment of Chinese para-military patrols and jet fighters close to the shores of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Armed hostilities loomed possible.  Hawks in Beijing have utilized the disputes to fan the flames of anti-Japanese sentiment, which led to violent protests in China against Japanese interests and products in 2012.

Pre-modern Vietnam had waged a millennium-old war of anti-colonial resistance against its powerful northern neighbor.  Vietnam’s very national identity has been shaped by what it sees as a struggle for independence against China.  Unlike Japan and the Philippines, Vietnam has had to contend with both continental as well as maritime disputes with China.  In 1974, China effectively evicted (South) Vietnam from the Paracels in the South China Sea and mounted a full-scale invasion of Vietnam in 1979.  In 1988, Vietnam faced another bloody skirmish with China over disputed islands in the Spratlys.  In mid-2014, Vietnam and China relations suffered a huge setback after Beijing deployed a giant oil rig into Vietnamese-claimed waters.

However, both Japan and Vietnam[1] have maintained robust diplomatic channels with China, while rapidly developing their deterrence capabilities.  Both Tokyo and Hanoi have tried (with considerable success) to maintain large-scale economic ties with China, defend their territorial integrity, and avoid outright conflict. They have accomplished this difficult balancing act by combining pro-active engagement with a determined push to enhance their deterrence capabilities.  Leaders in Japan and Vietnam have tried to ensure territorial disputes with China do not define their overall relationship with Asia’s new superpower.   In economic terms, China is a leading trading partner and source of investments for Vietnam . With respect to Japan, China is a critical investment and consumer market as well as a key source of rare earth elements.

Pursuing (and maintaining) engagement with China has always risked domestic political backlash for rivals, especially among more hawkish circles, which view China as a monolithic expansionist power. In 2014, as the dispute with China entered a dangerous stage, Japan’s nationalist leader, Shinzo Abe, took a huge gamble when he instructed his diplomats to open communication channels with China, culminating in a formal dialogue between Abe and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, on the sidelines of the APEC Summit in Beijing.  Abe’s meeting with Xi ended up in one of the world’s most awkward handshakes, but it did not take long before Japan and China resumed high-level talks among their foreign and defense ministries, and began exploring various confidence-building measures to avoid accidental clashes in the high seas.

Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, left, and China’s President Xi Jinping, right, shake hands during their meeting at the Great Hall of the People, on the sidelines of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings, in Beijing, Monday, Nov. 10, 2014. President Xi and Prime Minister Abe held an ice-breaking meeting Monday on the sidelines of an Asia-Pacific conference in Beijing, following more than two years of deep tensions over an island dispute. (AP Photo/Kim Kyung-Hoon, Pool)

At the height of their disputes in the South China Sea last year, Vietnam hosted China’s leading foreign policy advisor, Yang Jiechi, and dispatched a top official, Le Hong Anh, to Beijing to de-escalate tensions. Soon, the two countries signed their third hotline, between their defense ministries, while the country’s party chief, Nguyen Phu Troung, made a high-profile visit to Beijing in mid-2015.  China not only withdrew the oil rig from Vietnamese waters; it also did not dispatch additional ones.  In exchange, Vietnam is said to have temporarily shelved the option of taking the dispute to an international court.  All the while, Vietnam as well as Japan have augmented their presence close to disputed features, fortified their position on the ground, and have embarked on a long-term initiative to enhance their defensive capabilities.

The Philippines can draw crucial lessons from its neighbors. First and foremost, it has to acknowledge the importance of maintaining high-level communication channels with Beijing. So far, Aquino and Xi are yet to hold a single formal summit.  For what is publicly known, Manila has not established a single hotline with China to prevent accidental clashes in the high seas and make sure they do not escalate into a full-scale conflict.

It is important to make sure Manila’s bilateral relations with China are not primarily defined by their conflicts but rather by their long-term shared interests.  Finally, the Philippines must also draw lessons from poorer neighbors such as Vietnam, which, instead of relying on external powers, are investing in their own air, naval, and coast guard capabilities in order to push back against Chinese assertiveness.

With Xi Jinping expected to visit Manila for the APEC summit later this year, there is a crucial opportunity to kick start a more proactive engagement with Beijing, keeping in mind the importance of diplomacy not only to mobilize friends but also outsmart or neutralize rivals.  Ultimately, however, as the more powerful party Beijing bears the greater responsibility for reaching out to its much-weaker and vulnerable neighbor.  This is apparently what the Chinese ambassador Zhao Jianhua has done recently, with the assurance that the Philippines is not in any way excluded from the Chinese-sponsored Maritime Silk Road (Remo 2015).  To encourage good will, China should offer greater economic incentives without any geopolitical preconditions. For starters, China can also boost confidence-building efforts by permanently postponing the imposition of any Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea.  It could also raise hopes for greater cooperation by ending its unilateral, coercive occupation of the Scarborough Shoal, ending para-military patrols close to Philippine- controlled features in the area, agreeing to a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, and start negotiating mutually-satisfying joint development schemes with its neighbors.  More than anyone else, the ball is in China’s court, but it is also necessary for the Philippines to re-calibrate its diplomatic posturing, driven by more reason than emotions or ideological preferences.

REFERENCES

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Blanchard, J. and Shen, S. 2015. Conflict and Cooperation in Sino-US Relations. London/New York: Routledge.

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Dong, W. 2015. “Is China trying to push the U.S. out of East Asia?” China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies 1(1): 59–84.

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Heydarian, R. J. 2015. “The Diplomatic Implications of Philippine-China Arbitration”, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies. January 21, 2015.

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Li, J. 2014. “Managing tension in the South China Sea: Comparing the China-Philippines and the China-Vietnam approaches.” RSIS Working Paper No. 273. Singapore: Nanyang Technological University.

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Allan, A. 1974. “Red arms smuggling plot busted.” Philippine Daily Express, August 29, 1974, pp. 1-2.

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Bosco, J. 2015. “America’s Asia Policy: The New Reality.”  The Diplomat, 23 June 2015.

Chubb, A. 2015. “The South China Sea: Defining the ‘Status Quo’.” Name of publication, 11 June 2015.

Fonbuena, C. 2014.  “SC orals on EDCA: China threat looms over charter issues.” Rappler, 18 November 2014.

Fonbuena, C. 2015. “Miriam sends anti-EDCA draft resolution to Supreme Court.” Rappler, 30 June 2015.

Jakobson, L. and Medcalf, R. 2015. “The perception gap: Reading China’s maritime objectives in Indo-Pacific Asia.” Lowy Institute for International Policy, 23 June 2015.

Heydarian, R. J. 2015. “The China challenge in the West Philippine Sea.” Rappler, 12 June 2015.

Heydarian, R. J. 2015. “Made in Beijing: An Anti-China Alliance Emerges.” The National Interest, 13 June 2015.

Heydarian, R.J. 2015. “Engaging China: Time for smart diplomacy.”  Rappler, 16 June 2015.

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Heydarian, R. J. 2015. “Time for China and the Philippines to Talk: Resolving the South China Sea Conundrum.” The World Post, 18 June 2015.

Heydarian, R.J. 2015. “Chinese-Filipino Community’s Dilemma: The Philippines, China, and the China South Sea Disputes.” The World Post, 28 June 2015.

Katigbak, J. 2015. “US to China: Prove your claim.” Philippine Star, 29 June 2015.

Malay, R. 2005. “How NPA guerillas lost China’s support”. Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 29, 2005, p. A1.

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Reuters. 2015. “China: Changing position on sea dispute would shame ancestors.” GMA News Online, 27 June 2015.

Torode, G. 2015. “’Paving Paradise’: Scientists alarmed over China island-building in disputed sea.” Jakarta Globe, 26 June 2015.

Uy, V. 2013. “Scarborough Standoff a year later: Don’t take the US side and other tips from a Chinese expert.” InterAksyon.com, 10 April 2013.

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Garcia, Z. 2014. “China’s Military Modernization, Japan’s Normalization and its Effects on the South China Sea Territorial Disputes.” FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 1315. http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/1315 (Accessed 19 July 2015).

Hendriks, J. T. 2015. “Rebalancing great power politics: a new cold war between the US and China.” Master’s thesis, Leiden University.

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[1] Li (2014) compares China-Vietnam and China-Philippine relations and concludes that from a conflict management perspective, China and Vietnam have sought to manage their border disputes through the establishment and development of a system of talks.  This approach has resulted in both formal settlement of land border and Gulf of Tonkin disputes and in better management of disputes in the South China Sea.  In contrast, between China and the Philippines, attempts were made to establish mechanisms for conflict management in the 1900s and 2000s but they have not been sustained, and in recent years the absence of such mechanisms have led to frosty relations.